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INTRODUCTION
The civil war in Nigeria between the Federal Military
Government and the self -proclaimed Republic of Biafra entered
its third year on June 6, 1969. During the two years of armed
belligerency Biafra had dwindled in area under effective
control from an original total of 2.9,000 square miles to
1
approximately 2,500 square miles. lt:j population has been
2
reduced from approximately 13-million to now roughly one-half
o
that number. Despite such dramatic losses to its resources and
confronted with little apparent prospect of ever obtaining the
complete independence originally sought by the Biafrans, there
is as yet no positive sign that this conflict has approached any
form of bilateral resolution between the combatants. For a
period of the last half of 1968 and early 1969, the people of the
world community were exposed by the news media to the tremendous
destruction of peoples' most important human value -- life
itself, particularly that of women and children. Nov; only
occasionally is there much publicity regarding the war and little
concerted effort is made to stop the waste despite the fact
that already more civilians have lost their lives as a direct
result of this conflict than is the case in the Viet Nam and
4
the Arab-Israeli continuing confrontations.
To the casual observer the conflict is simply one between
the Nigerian government and the Ibo tribesmen; it is limited
to an arena wholly within the geographical boundaries that
originally depicted the state of Nigeria, and it is being
fought for a simply described value entitled freedom. If such
a superficial analysis were true the conflict would most likely

never have arisen, or if it had in that context, it would have
been resolved some considerable time ago.
It is accurate to describe the arena of physical combat as
that within the limits of Nigeria, but because of the interests
at stake in the final outcome, a large part of Africa is really
involved in the conflict. Not only is a much larger area
involved, but so also are there a- large number of actual
participants in the conflict supporting the combatants, each
with its own hierarchy of values at stake in the resolution.
Particularly interesting to note are the unusual alliances that
have been formed, many of which are a result of relatively
recently developed goals, and others that are a rebirth of
colonial aspirations (if those ever completely ceased to exist.)
For example, the Federal side finds its support not only from
i
the mild form of continued United States recognition that it
constitutes the only valid government, but also from the combined
military assistance of Great Britain, Russia, and Egypt. While
formal recognition of Biafra has been very limited in the world
community of nations, both France and Portugual have given
considerable support to the Biafran government without which it
is doubtful that the war could have continued nearly as long.
Other international participants in the conflict involve the
regional Organization of African Unity, the multi-national
Commonwealth of Nations, the International Committee of the Red
Cross, and certain private multinational organizations such as
the World Council of Churches and Cartis, the Catholic Relief
agency. All of the above parties are attempting to maximize
certain human values that they deem to be the most important

and while some of these values are exclusive to the Nigerian
crisis, the far greater portion are inclusive of interests that
transcend the internal conflict itself
»
It is the purpose of this paper to attempt, to analyze the
Nigerian conflict from two distinct but interrelated aspects.
The first is to determine why the combat situation has continued
for such a lengthy period and why- it will continue for some
considerable time in the future. The second goal is to examine
the interplay of the important participants and how the goals
each is seeking have contributed to the continuation of the
hostilities. Traditional international law in which the roles
of various nation-states can be depicted in either black or
white by the use of set rules simply is inadequate to a
useful examination of a conflict such as that in Nigeria in the
present day world* A more useful methodology is to be. used
in this paper that hopefully will result in a less superficial
analysis of the conflict . enabling a more enlightened view of
5




I • HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA UNDERLYING
THE BIAFRA CONFLICT
PRJL-COLQn IAL PER I OP.
Fundamental to any comprehensive understanding of the
present conflict in its true perspective must be a historical
discussion of the development of Nigeria from the early-
European interventions up to and including the declaration of
secession by Biafra. Only in the light of such a historical
discussion can the true roles of the participants and their
present expectations be properly analyzed in a true perspective.
The first recorded European explorers to visit the coast of
what is now Nigeria were the Portuguese Fernao do Po and Pero
de Cintra who investigated the Bights of Biafra and Benin in
6
the winter of 1472-7 3. Although this was the first Portuguese
venture into this particular area, the Portuguese considered
themselves to have the exclusive rights to all o'f the V/est
Coast of Africa by virtue of certain Papal Bulls they had
-. 7
obtained as early as 1451 . It was not long after do Po before
the Portuguese established the first European settlement in
the area on the island of Sao Thome. There was no native
resistance to their acts as there was no indigenous population
on the island. Once they were established the Portuguese then
sought a source of labor to support their .trading operations
with the coastal natives. Slavery was a common phenomenon
among the coastal tribes and its victims were readily sold to
the Portuguese. It was not long before the local whites
discovered that the slaves they obtained could be resold to
the prospering gold merchants of the V/est Coast for twice their

original cost. By 1510 the European trade with the natives
8
of Benin was almost exclusively in slaves. And so began the
first exploitation of African human lives to satisfy the
economic desires of the Europeans.
The earliest European competitors of the Portuguese were
the Spanish, but with the discovery of the Americas the
Spaniards turned to the exploitation of another hemisphere,
leaving Portugual in a very secure position in West Africa for
at least a time. The end of the Portuguese monopoly of trade
on the West Coast was marked by the voyage of the English
9
explorer, Windham, into the area in 1553. The English soon
successfully challenged their predecessor's position and Britain
was established as not only "a leading trader on the coast,
10
but as one of the chief exporters of slaves."
i
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the West
{
Coast become a "centre of European enterprise and rivalry
11
with slaves as the prize," There was no one single tribe whose
population provided the entire body of slaves sold < to the
Europeans by the natives of the Delta states, but one of the most
12
called upon sources was the populous Ibo tribe of the interior.
One prominent Nigerian historian, Michael Crowder, quotes with
approval an estimate of an early slave trader that between the
years 1800-22 some 370,000 Ibos had been sold into slavery by
their fellow Africans. Crowder then concludes : "This may seem
a tremendous figure, but it certainly had its raison d ' etre




The beginnings of the establishment of British colonies

in Nigeria was marked by the English abolition of the slave
trade in 1807. The apparent paradox of such an act was that at
the turn of the century England had been the "chief carrier of
14
slaves from West Africa." Humanitarian principles of course
may have played some part in such an uprighteous decision, but
the real value served by this change of policy remained an
attempt to maximize the wealth value of Britain's trading
economy and native well-being was only incidental. At the
time under consideration palm oil was a very important commodity
that was used in the manufacture of soap and as a major lubricant
for emerging European industry. "While the slave trade continued,
production in the oil growing areas of the interior of West
Africa would always be hampered. It was therefore very much
in the interests of Britain to check slavery in order to permit
i 15
the economic exploitation of the coast," After the abolition
Britain's palm oil trade continued to increase in the region
to become Nigeria. By 1834, for example, it was worth L500,000
16
per year which was a huge sum for those times. \ Yet ait
economic activity remained restricted to trading operations on
the coast through the African kings and middlemen who strongly
resisted any penetration into the interior by Europeans. Of
singular assistance to the native attitude was an extremely high
mortality rate of the non-Africans caused by malaria. This
discouraged any permanent settlements on the mainland, particularly
in the interior
•
Quinine was successfully used as a prophylactic against
malaria in 1852 and soon after life was possible for the
17
Europeans in the interior of the country. With control of

the sources of the palm oil no longer denied to the traders
they were soon followed by consuls established by Britain in
the Niger Delta region to regulate trade. These diplomatic
endeavors soon proved inadequate to produce sufficient affection
of the independent natives and action was taken which would
eventually lead to the creation of a colonial domain in an
attempt to satisfy British economic interests.
DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH COLONIAL RULE
The first British intervention in the actual political
structure of the Niger region occurred in 1851 when the slave-
trading King of Lagos was deposed by the British who replaced him
18
with his more tractable uncle. This partial solution did not
fully satisfy the British economic interests and so in a
proclaimed attempt to put a stop to the slave trade, Britain
19
occupied Lagos in 1861 . In July 1861, the local ruler ceded
v
Lagos to the British and thus "half in the guise 5 of humanitarian
motives, Britain had gained her first foothold on the Nigerian
20
coast primarily to secure her trade." .
The British had expanded their sphere of control over the
peoples to include by 1866 the territory of the Yoruba tribe'
adjacent to Lagos -- at the expense of native rulers and the
French who were seeking to promote their own colonial interests
among the Yorubas to the west: of Lagos. The newly acquired
British area was attached to the Colony of Lagos to form the
21
Colony and Protectorate of Lagos. The period between 1878
and 1882 witnessed an ever increasing rivalry develop between
the British United African Company and the French Compagnie du
Senegal et de la Cote Occidentale d'Afrique each seeking to

8promote its own national economic interests. Finally the
French were forced out of business in the area in 1884 when the
British undercut already low prices by as much as 25 per cent
22
and emerged with full control over the western region.
As a direct result of the colonial settlements of the
Berlin Conference of 1885, the British formally proclaimed a
protectorate of the Niger districts by which both Lagos and the
Oil Rivers Protectorate to the east were directly cidministered
by the British government. The territories and people in the
center of present day Nigeria and the valleys of the Niger and
Benue Rivers were placed under the control of the Royal Niger




The charter of the Royal Niger Company was revoked in 1899
i
and the British government assumed direct control over, the entire
24
northern area as the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria as
described by external boundaries agreed upon with the French by
25
the Convention of 1898. The southernmost tip of \ the northern
territory was merged with the Niger Coast Protectorate to form
26
the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. In 1906 Lagos was
joined with Southern Nigeria to form the Colony and Protectorate
of Southern Nigeria which was then administered entirely from
27
Lagos. Sir Frederick Lugard, a man much blamed for subsequent
Nigerian political idiosyncracies , was appointed as High
Commissioner of the territories in 1900. During the period
1906-12 he established the beginnings of effective administration
28
of both the North and South.
The administrative amalgamation of the North and South

was finally achieved in 1914, but it vzas Lugard's philosophy
that dictated the maintenance of a considerable distinction
between colonial institutions of the North and South. One of
the reasons for such a decision was Britain's economic policy
29
of colonial self-sufficiency, but at least equally a consideration
was Lugard's idealistic conception that it was the task of
Britain to carry justice and freedom throughout the world and
to implement that policy there should be in the colonies:
equal admiration for those who achieve in matters social
and racial a separate path, each pursuing his own traditions,
preserving his own race purity and race pride, equality
in things spiritual, agreed divergence in the physical and
material. 30
His philosophy created a system of indirect rule and "tended to
31
preserve tribal consciousness" when indeed there were at the
time no inconsiderable differences between many of the various
tribes, especially the "majority" Hausa-Fulanl , Ibo and Yoruba
groups
,
In the North the climate vzas semi -arid and' characteristic
of these inhabited areas surrounding the Sahara Desert. The
Hausa-Fulani group embraced the Moslem religion and had dominated
the region for some time. Its powerful governmental institutions
of emirates had been well established by the sixteenth century
and exhibited a well organized fiscal system and a trained
32
judiciary subject to the control of only a few individuals.
The Northern economy, religion and culture had been oriented
toward the Sudan and the Arabic states to the north for
33
centuries and largely ignored the tribes of the south. To the
present day the "Moslem elements comprise the majority of the
34
people in the north."

10
Two main tribes existed in the generally moist, rain-
forested South. In the western region were the Yoruba who were
dominant o This section was the most homogeneous culturally.
Even before British colonial, rule had been imposed, modern forms
of government were operating, organized into cities and towns
with a clan system in only the rural areas. The important
dec is ion -makers of the Yoruba were the chiefs who as in the North
35
were also very powerful within their individual domains.
The eastern region of the South, was comprised mainly of the Ibo
solely by virtue of their abundant population. Here there were
no strong political institutions before the British. The
tribal society was controlled by a loose chieftan-counsel
arrangement which had very severely limited authority and was
dependent to a great degree upon a familial type relationship
which if necessary imposed sanctions on members of the tribal
36
unit. It has been said with considerable accuracy that "the
37
precolonial Ibos seem to have had no political cohesion."
In 1914 and the years following, the British adopted
completely different policies with regard to the administration
and development of the political institutions of the North and
South based on the characteristics of the people as set forth
above. In the North Lugard retained and strengthened the
established governmental organizations and firmly established
the position of the existing rulers despite what their strength
may have been without British support, The 'colonial decision-
makers formulated the policies, but the rulers were left to
administer them. Thus even the rulers who had earlier come into
power by force were enabled to retain that power with British

11
support which thereby gave the native Leaders of the North
38
unassailable authority.
Not only were the emirs of the North strenghtened by the
colonial political system established by Lugard's policies,
but it was further agreed with the Sultan of Sokoto that there
would be no interference with the Moslem religion. No Christian
missionaries were to be permitted into the Northern areas
39
without permission of the local rulers. This agreement was
to have far-reaching consequences, not particularly because of
the possibility that there may have been converts to Christianity,
but more important from the standpoint that one of the universal
indirect consequences of the missionaries ' zeal was the
enlightenment of the African natives in Western European
economic and political concepts as well as language.
No such agreement with regard to missionary activity was
made with the native leaders of the pagan and anamistic oriented
South.
"They [the missionaries] were convinced that their own society-
was superior, and also that the conversion of the local, people
would have to be not only from the traditional religion [sic]
but from the whole way of life which intertwined with it and
supported it. They therefore deliberately set out to change
the very structure of traditional society. Until the be-
ginning of the twentieth century they had made only comparatively
small inroads into Nigerian society." 40
The Yorubas because of. their more organized society and accessibility
were the first to benefit from the Western education espoused
by the missionaries. It was not long before they became the
necessary native administrative class of the British colonial
system. Initially the Ibos of the East did not benefit to any
great degree from the missionaries' efforts principally because
of all areas, Iboland remained the least subject to the British

12
colonial control of its institutions and was relatively
41
disagreeable bush.
The Yoruba educational and social supremacy in Western
culture was not destined to last. Once roads and railroads
began to penetrate the Ibo regions of the east and the members
of the tribe were able to (1) benefit from the educational efforts
of the missionaries and (2) to reach the rest of the colony, they
left their overcrowded homeland in search of new opportunities.
So great was their zeal that "within the space of only one
generation the Ibo . . . emerged as an economic as well as a
42
political threat outside his homeland." Since the Moslem
communities of the North conducted only a very modest educational
program tailored carefully to the traditional demands and values
of the native authorities, it became of necessity that the
Southerners were imported into the North as the vital clerks and
artisans of the new concepts. These initially sinal] groups of
educated Southerners became concentrated in the- sabon gar is
(strangers' quarters) of the Northern townships which were the
centers of intensive secondary acculturation and the foci of the
43
eventual Northern awakening,
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIVE PARTICIPATION THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL
REFORMATION
The colony was given its first constitution in 1922. This
instrument provided for the first time in British Africa for
44
the election' of African members to a Legislative Council. The
Legislative Council was comprised of 36 British and ten native
Nigerian members who were responsible for the Southern
Protectorate and Lagos. The Northern Protectorate continued

13
to be ruled by the Governor by proclamation aided by the advice
45
of an Executive Council.
A uniform institutional structure for the entire colony
was not forthcoming until the Richards Constitution of 1946.
Its proclaimed objects were to (1) promote the unity of Nigeria;
(2) provide adequately within that unity for the diverse
elements which constituted parts of the country; and (3) secure
greater participation by Africans in the discussion of their
46
own affairs. Under the Richards provisions the Legislative
Council tripled its native membership while the British
component was reduced to one -ha If its former strength. The
most significant of all its modifications relative to the Biafran
conflict was the creation of regional advisory Councils for the
newly created Eastern , Northern, and Western Provinces. The
Council now legislated for the whole of Nigeria, but much
47
decision-making power was given to the regional governments.
The provinces were designated regions and each region was
given a larger and more representative legislature by the
48
Macpherson Constitution of 1950. These regional assemblies
were also enlarged and given additional legislative and
financial powers. Each had its own Executive Council in which
there was a majority of African members. Revenues were to be
distributed to the regions according to need rather than as
49
formerly on the colonial basis of derivation.
Ever increasing demands for national independence and for
greater autonomy for each of the three regions led to the
formation of the Federation of Nigeria under the provisions of
the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954. This charter was to

1'!
become the foundation of the government of independent Nigeria.
It emphasized even more the regions at the expense of the
central government by a grant of all residual powers to the
regions, The regions were to a large extent independent in
the management of their financial affairs. They were permitted
to determine their own electoral system and both the East and
West instituted direct elections while the North continued to
50
use an indirect system. Each region now had its own
governor who in his discretion appointed a regional premier
and other lesser regional ministers on the recommendations of
51
his premier. The 1954 Constitution was very important 5 n that
it marked
:
the end of the nationalist struggle with Britain; for the
next six years, until the achievement of independence on
1st October 1960, Nigerian leaders were preoccupied not so
much with wresting power from the colonial government as
dealing with the day-to-day administration and development
of their country as well as settling; the basis on which
they_ would,. ,, cooperate... with, each other , 52 [emphasis added"]
The lack of a common enemy and the prospect of independence
did not insure tranquillity among the Nigerians by any means.
Regional differences began to take on at times violent overtones
which would subsequently increase after independence. For
example, as a result of certain alleged indignities suffered
by the Northern leaders earlier from verbal attacks by Southern
politicians, the Northerners announced an eight point plan for
their Region which, if implemented, would have amounted to its
virtual secession from Nigeria. Southern political leaders
campaigned in the North against these proposals. They also
campaigned for national independence to be granted in 1956.
The latter was opposed by Northern leaders who would be dependent

15
upon the educated Southern immigrants to carry out a large part
53
of the functions of government. Tensions ran high and they
finally erupted into violence which resulted in four days of
riots in Kay, 1956, at Kano in the Northern Region directed
against the Southerners in the sabon garjL. The official result
indicated thirty-six were killed and 241 wounded; "although
54
it is almost certain that the numbers were much larger," The
British had only briefly departed the effective political arena
when two themes to become common to Nigerian politics in the
future surfaced; (1) Threats of secession and (2) Use of
violence to obtain political goals.
As a result of several changes made to the existing
constitution in 1957, both the Eastern and Western Regions of
55'
the South became internally self governing in August, 1957,
i
The Northern Region lacked the educational background and though
. 56
it had embarked on a large scale education program, it
"refused to be rushed into self government on the grounds
that [its] Northern cadres were not ready to take over the
region's administration. With eighteen million, people to
govern and only a handful of university graduates, and
probably no more than 2,000 holders of school certificate,
[sic] the formation of a Northern administration would be
dependent upon expatriates or Southerners," 57
The Northern Regional leaders again considered secession, but
finally consented to follow suit and became self-governing
58
in March 1959, With the stage set, October 1, 1960, was planned
as the date for independence. Native political parties began
the campaign for the national elections scheduled to be held
in December 1959.
NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES
Nigerian political parties of course did not just spontaneously

16
appear for the 1959 elections. They had been a major force
in the internal decision-making processes of Nigeria for some
time. The first political party in Nigeria was the Nigerian
National Democratic Party founded in 1923. It really represented
more of the awakening of national consciousness among various
sections of British West Africa rather than a truly Nigerian
59
party. The first Nigerian party to be internally oriented
and to have continued existence was the National Council of
Nigeria and the Cameroon s (NCNC) founded in 1944 by an American-
60
trained Ibo graduate, Nnamdi Azikiwe. Because of Dr. Azikiwe'
s
charismatic hold over his fellow Ibos, it soon became the Ibos
61
who supplied the chief support for the NCNC.
A second major political party was formed b}' a Yoruba,
Abafemi Awolowo, from a tribal cultural organization. In 1951
this became the Action Group (AG) . Although the AG was not
exclusively Yoruba, the main basis of its support was with
the Yoruba intelligensia and traditional tribal' ruling elements.
Initially the North was little affected by the political
parties of the South during the period 1945 to 1951, but since
indirect elections were scheduled for 1951 as a result of the
1950 Macpherson Constitution, the Northern People's Congress
was established (after the primary stages of the election had
been held) as a Northern base to "treat with the Southerners
63
on a national level," The party's leaders were the Sarduana
of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello, and. a former Northern teacher, Abubakr.r
Ta f awa Ba 1ewa
.
These political parties, the AG of the Yorubas, the NCNC




control in the 1951 elections of the region in which its tribe
was predominant. Then "each one set out to consolidate its
64
power [in its region] by reducing the opposition." During
this period marked by the preparation for independence and
consolidation of power, the major Nigerian parties continued to
develop along tribal and regional lines -- a circumstance that
was later to have many unfortunate results. If the character
of the parties are to be described, they might be called parties
of "communal integration" in that they "give the communities the
sentiment of being represented and it is through them that the




Therefore, while on the eve of independence Nigeria had
three major political parties contending for power in the
national arena and apparently had avoided the one party system
of many of -the other emerging African states, in reality none
of the parties was organized on the basis of a truly national
appeal. There was one controlling party within each of the
three regions and that party also represented the major tribal
group of the region. When this fact is considered, then it is
not surprising that as a result of the 1959 federal elections
the NPC won most of the Northern seats, the AG the majority of
66
the West, and the NCHC controlled the Eastern allocation.
No one party controlled enough seats in the Federal
Parliament so it became necessary to form a coalition federal
government, Awolowo of the AG sought to join with Azikiwe of the
NCNC to give control to the South, However, Azikiwe and the
NCNC had made a pre-election commitment to the NPC, They decided
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to fulfill that obligation and the AG was left as the opposition.
The Prime Minister was BaTewa of the NPC and the Governor-General
was Azikiwe of the NCNC. Many reasons have been offered for the
North-East alignment. One of the most plausible suggests that
because Azikiwe was the most consciously nationalist of all the
Nigerian leaders, he may have felt that the new nation would
not have been able to survive the strain that would have been
67
engendered by a North-South parliamentary confrontation.
One of the reasons behind the nationalist feelings and the
subsequent coalition decision by Azikiwe is the fact that while
NCNC strength was in the East, it also represented the Ibos.
As has been pointed out earlier, the Ibos had emmigrated from
Iboland as soon as the means were available. During the period
now under discussion they were disbursed throughout the country,
i
both North and South, in large numbers in or about all the major
68 t
urban centers. The best protection of both Ibo and Eastern
interests then logically dictated a position which would insure
the NCNG an effective role in the decision making process in
the national arena while also attempting to maintain the integrity
of the entire nation.
II • POST INDEPENDENCE CONFLICT AND .SECESSION
Nigeria became independent October 1, I960, as the Federation
69
of Nigeria. It. comprised an area of 356,699 square miles and
a population of approximately 35-million persons to make it the
70
largest of all African nations . The new nation was expected
to be the leader of the host of newly emerging African states of
the period and to also be one of the major effective participants
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in the arena of African politics. It was considered to be the
ultimate example of what an enlightened British colonial policy
could do. In general, the native population was well educated.
Since 1947, the people had been exposed to long and apparently
constructive participation in the national decision-making
processes in a government that had possessed a high degree of
autonomy before independence was granted . The Nigerian economy
was well established on a firm foundation mainly because of a
large agricultural surplus for export in addition to bright
prospects of large petroleum reserves in the southeastern section
71
of the country.
Retrospect shows that within the country itself there was
a malignancy created by tribalism, educational and religious
differences, all magnified by internal political struggles for
i
power that eventually resulted in the present civil war.
THE POLITICAL PARTIES STRUGGLE FOR POWER '
The drift toward a one -party system in each of the regions
was further illustrated by the regional elections held after
independence. The elections for the Northern Region House of
Assembly seats were held in May 1961. The NPC won 160 seats',
72
the AG nine, and the NCNC only one. The defeat of the Eastern
politicians had been almost complete, but the NCNC was not to be
outdone on its home ground. In November 3 961, the elections for
the Eastern Region House of Assembly were held. The results
gave the NCNC 106 seats, independents twenty, the AG fifteen,
73
the Small Dynamic Party five, and the NPC none. In the same
manner the AG controlled the Western Regional Assembly with 63




27 per cent. The remaining 10 per cent went to independents
.
The results of the regional elections of 1961 illustrate
also that no one party had absolute control within its region.
The reasons for this fact are twofold. In the first place,
because of the regional tribal character of the parties, the
Yorubas and Ibos living in the North looked to the AG and NCNC
respectively as their advocates in the regional political arena.
Secondly was the fact that although each region had its dominant
tribes, in total there are over 200 distinct tribal groups in
Nigeria. These minorities could defend their interests only
to the degree they could ally themselves with the dominant
parties of other regions than their own . The combination of
these two forces allowed certain sections within each region
to elect a representative from a non-dominant or independent party.
,
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Even though the NPC-NCNC coalition Federal Government gained
in cohesion in its early period and remained a viable entity until
the end of . a full term of Parliament, showing signs of internal
76
dissention only in its last year, that does not mean the
struggle for control of the central government by each of the
parties by any means ceased. The NPC was firmly entrenched in
the tradition-oriented Northern Region which had the largest
population, The NCNC only was similiarly situated in the East
and also was strongly supported by Ibos everywhere in the nation.
The AG. on the other hand, with its Yoruba -Western orientation,
77
had been a collective association from its beginning and never
enjoyed the strength the other two parties exhibited in its
internal structure. This fact was recognized by the other parties
who realized the Western Region was the arena that could provide
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complete control of the Federal institution if only the affecti
of the Ag could be removed and its supporters rallied behind
either the NCNG or the NPC.
THE WESTERN ARENA
The leadership of the AG sought on the one hand through
AwoloWo to campaign on the national level avd to seek a NCNC-AG
coalition, while another faction led by Chief Akintola sought
to secure the party's position in the West and not risk the
possibility of endangering a possible •"regional security"
arrangement between the competing parties. This divisiveness
from within was even more accentuated by the passage of a
Government sponsored motion in March 1962, which proposed the
78
creation from the territory of the West a new Midwest Region.
The Western Regional Assembly quite correctly diagnosed this
move when it censured the action as one intended "to destroy
7 9
Western Nigeria by fragmentation." Yet even before regional
elections could be held in the newly created Midwest } the AG
began to break apart from within
.
\
In Hay 1962, an attempt was made to oust Akintola as the
Western Premier by certain: AG leaders because, of alleged "ma,l-
80
administration, anti-party activities and gross indiscipline."
The National Executive Council of the party led by Awolowo approved
and demanded Akintola' s resignation:. Before the month of Hay
could end the Western House of Assembly was called upon to vet::
approval of a new regional Premier. Awolowo followers were
confident of their majority, but the Akintola faction receiv< n
the support of the NCNC members to cause riots in the Assembly
meeting before any vote could be taken. After the second riot
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in the Assembly, the Federal Parliament met for only one day to
declare a state of emergency in the Western Region.
An administrator was immediately appointed and restrictions
were placed on the activities of all leading politicians. Within
two months of Federal control all of the Akintola and NCNC group
had been released, but the "officeholders and many of the 82
principal organizers of the Action Group remained restricted."
Awolowo was shortly removed completely from the Nigerian political
arena when in November 1962, he was convicted and sentenced to
prison for 10 years on charges he had planned to overthrow the
Federal Government. Interestingly enough, ^incontroverted evidence
was introduced at the Awolowo trial which clearly indicated the
AG had sent men abroad for military training and also that arms
83 • •
had been smuggled into the West.
As a result of the convictions of' Awolowo, Chief Enahoro,
and many of the other leaders of the AG, they were at least
temporarily unable to participate in the establishment of the
new Western Region government at the end of the year when the
State of Emergency ended. Akintola thus resumed his former
position as regional Premier, but this time his support was .
derived from the NCNC and an AG splinter group, the United People's
Party (UPP) . In return for the NCNC support the Western
government supported the referendum to be held in its Benin and
Delta Provinces in July 1963 on the proposed Midwest Region.
CREATION OF A FOURTH REGION AND THE NATIONAL CENSUS
The vote was favorable to the formation and the Midwest
Region was created. Elections were held in early 1 96^ which




NCNC. During the period the struggle was being carried out
in the West for political power , the NPC had established almost
complete control of the North. Because of its large population,
the North increased its power which in turn began to manifest
itself at the federal level. The Northerners "began to behave
less like senior oartners and : more like tolerant but firm
86
masters." Because of the changes brought about by political
consolidations of bases of power, the nation became definitely-
well advanced in the process of changing from a North-East coalition
to a North-South confrontation.
The key to the political control of the nation that the
North was depending upon was based on a favorable distribution
of population. All politicians began looking forward to the
results of a new census. The last one had been taken in 1952-53
and had given the North only a very slight majority in the total
number of persons, A new census which would possibly reallocate
seats in the Federal House of Representatives was initially
conducted in 1962, Its results showed the North with a 30 per
cent increase, but the West and the East indicated increases
87
varying from 120 per cent to 200 per cent. Several attempt's were
made to reconcile the totals, but finally "in view of the loss
88
of confidence in the figures" the results were never published.
A new census was scheduled for November 1963. The final results
of the 1963 census were made public in February 1964, and indicated
Nigeria's total population to be 55,653,821-- an overall increase
of 74 per cent in a decade. The North rose by 67 per cent, the
89
East by 65 per cent, and the V/est by almost 100 per cent.
The totals, if accepted, would be reflected in the Federal
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Parliament by giving the North 167 of a total of 312 seats. If
the strength of the NPC was as great in the North as the party
assumed, there V7as an excellent chance that after future Federal
elections there would be no need for the North to share the
control of the central governmental institution. The leaders
of the MCNC of course objected loudly that the figures were
90
"inflated [and] worse than useless," The North accepted the
figures as did the NPC dominated Federal Government. The
political leaders of the Western Region saw a guaranteed
opportunity to improve their position in the Federal government
if they aligned themselves with the North which needed their
support for a change . They would also be able to rid themselves
of the Ibos and the NCNC who had become increasingly unpopular
90a
and disliked among the Yorubas. Thus the West supported the
NPC position. When the Midwest recogriized there was no hope for
the Eastern position, it also supported the results of the census.
The East could onl}' continue to object knowing its futility • Now
opposed by a North-West combination, Eastern hopes were based
on the fact that if somehow it could gain enough seats in the
North in the approaching Federal elections to. prevent a NPC .
majority, the West would join in a Southern coalition government.
THE POST -INDEPENDENCE FEDERAL ELECTION
On December- 4, 1964, President Azikiwe dissolved the Federal
Parliament and the first post-independence federal elections
92
were scheduled for the thirtieth of that month. All of the
old political parties regrouped for the coming election under
two headings. The National Nigerian Alliance (NNA) was led
by the NPC which combined with the newly formed Nigerian National
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Democratic Party established by Akintola. By this time he
was in firm control of the West. The other contender was entitled
the United Progressive Alliance (UPGA) and was led by the NCNC
93
under Dr. Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region.
Shortly before the elections were to be held the NCNC
realized just how much its position in the national political
arena had deteriorated, especially in the Northern provinces.
Okpara sought to postpone the upcoming election apparently
seeking time to attempt to regain much of the ground that had
been lost. he objected to the election date and alleged again
fraud in the 1964 census and also that UPGA candidates were
being almost completely excluded from participating in the
campaign in many of the Northern provinces. In fact, many of
the NPC candidates were returned unopposed in provinces where
94
UPGA supporters had been specifically designated to run.
A meeting of the leaders of the regions was held in Lagos
on December 29th to determine whether the elections should be
held as scheduled. That same day after the conference the Premier
of the Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, issued a statement
charging that the real purpose of the Lagos meeting had not been
to resolve the election dispute, but to discuss the secession
95
of the Eastern Region from the Federation. Thus, the threat
of secession again crept into the negotiations for national power,
only this time it was the East. The threat was unsuccessful in
delaying the elections which were to be held as scheduled. The
UPGA stated it would boycott the elections and not accept any
government based on the results. At the same time it called






The. voting turnout was good in the North and West on the
scheduled date, but the declared boycott proved almost complete
in the East. Before the new. government was formed, the leaders
of the parties met again in Lagos and the NNA offered to allov;
the UPGA a role in the decision-making processes of the federal
government. On the basis of these promises supplemental elections
were conducted in March 1965 in the areas where the boycott had
been effective. The final results of the federal elections gave
the North-West coalition NNA 198 seats compared to 108 for the
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UPGA in the Parliament* Independents held the remainder,
THE WESTERN POLITICAL ARENA REVISITED
The West had not yet completed its role in the maneuvering
for political power. Elections for the Regional Parliament had
not been held since the "emergency" which had retained Ak into la
in power. The NNDP was well situated, but it had yet to win a
fully contested reg.ional_ election . There still then remained
some small glimmer of hope in the eyes of the UPGA, leadership
that if it could win the regional election, it would at least
control the South in the regional governments and then more
effectively threaten secession.
There were ninety-f our seats at stake, but although the
UPGA campaigned very vigorously, the regional government reported
98
a large number of NNDP candidates had been returned unopposed.
The UPGA protested without effect, as it had earlier in the North,
that its candidates had been fraudulently excluded by the ruling




policemen found thousands of ballot papers in the illegal
possession of electoral officials who were appointed by the
regional, government. Many of the ballot boxes were stuffed;
it was the concensus of impartial observers that the election
had been rigged to give the NNDP a three-to-one victory. 99
The actual victory was even greater as the final results gave the
NNDP a total of seventy-three seats as compared to only ninetee i
100
for the UPGA. The frustrations and anger of the followers of
many of the UPGA candidates who had been favored were vented
somewhat by outbreaks of violence against the regional government
such as setting fire to "scores" of homes of government
101
functionaries *
The violence done to the juridical concepts of the
constitutive system resulting from the Nigerian political
maneuverings which took place after independence had a considerable
tribal undercurrent whose nuijor advocates were the political
parties. The beginning of a new phase in the struggle, for power
was soon to change the nature of the Nigerian political arena.
EXTRA-JURIDICAL ATTEMPTS TO SEJ I URE POWER --1966' COUPS
January 15, 1966* marked a sudden change in the political
structure of the nation and a change in the method of seeking
to achieve desired values, On this date many junior army officers
(mostly Ibo) who were dissatisfied by the conduct and results
of the electoral process and also many highly irregular financial
dealings by politicians in power, led a military coup d'etat
by which the}7 intended to rectify matters. Federal Prime
Minister Balewa and his Finance Minister, Chief Okotie-Eboh
were kidnapped and subsequently found slain. The Premier of the
Northern Region, Sir Ahinadu Bello, and the Premier of the




political careers in the same manner. The fact that all the
government leaders who werve killed w< re net Ibos and 1
represented non-Ibo interests while the couo leaders we:
103
predominantly Jbo array officer*
., understandably aroused
cons5.dera.ble suspicion among the other tribes as to the exact
character of the takeover--particularly in the light of the Ibos'
continued political reversals.
IRONSI GOVERNMENT
On January 16th, Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, a
Northern-born, Hausa speaking Ibo who had been the commander of
104
the Nigerian army for almost a year and is generally agreed to
105
have not been originally connected with the coup, established
control of the government. What had actually occurred in the
two day period was a coup within a coup as the "original
conspirators who overthrew the government . . t [were] killed or
"106
arrested or forced to submit to General Ironsi's rule." Ironsi
then directed the Cabinet to give him full powers. He then
proceeded to abolish the Constitution, suspend the, Parliament,
the offices of Prime Minister and President, and all the
regional governors, premiers and legislatures. As a final
step, he appointed a military governor for each region under
107
the newly created Federal Military Government. The new
108
government banned civilian politicians and commenced a program
designed to emphasize the central government with a proclaimed
purpose of ultimately eliminating regionalism and tribalism, in
the country (a theme reminescent of the NCNC * s original goal).
Ironsi issued two decrees on Hay 24, 1966, to effectuate his plan.
One decree established a unitary state in order to remove all
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regionalism. The second dissolved all political parties until
January 1969, and also banned "all tribal unions propagating
109
po 1 i t i ca 1 id e a s or triba lism,"
Very shortly after Ironsi's decrees were issued violence
began in the Northern Region directed at the Ibos. Thousands of
unarmed civilian Ibo tribesmen were mutilated and killed by mobs
In some instances allegations were made that the police and
soldiers also participated in these assaults. Charges were made
by Ibos that the real instigators of all these acts were the
"prominent Hausa and Yoruba political leaders," and thus it was
claimed that "the massacres were a deliberate political act,
rather than . . . the spontaneous expression of the grievances
110
of undisciplined people,." Whether the latter was the case or
not, immediately after the first of the riots and killings,
thousands of Ibo refugees began to return to their traditional
i
homeland in the Eastern Region where Ironsi had appointed
Colonel C. Odumegvu Ojukwu as the military commander • The ever
increasing politico -tribal character of a violent confrontation
continued to act as a catalyst until events culminated in a
counter-coup staged on July 29, 1966. This time the mutinous
troops were led by officers of Hausa tribal origin, Ironsi was
killed, as were the Western Regional Commander and approximately
111
200 Ibo army officers. Any previous fiction that had existed
of unified, non-tribal Nigeria could no longer remain a viable
concept after this time.
GOWON GOVERNMENT AND NEW RIOTS
Once again there was some initial confusion as to who i
would lead the new government when control was assumed, but on
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August 1, 1 966, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Yakubu Gowon announced
without opposition that he was to be in charge of the Federal
Military Government. He also announced that he did not believe
a unitary government could succeed in Nigeria and he planned
to again place primary emphasis on the development of the
1 1 2
regional system. The Ibos immediately became political
scapegoats and a conflict arose which assumed an almost exclusive
aura of revenge against the members of that tribe ~- not unlike
that which was expressed at other times against the Jews of
Eastern Europe or the Asians of East Africa.
It was not long after the Gowon' s government became firmly
established that new outbreaks of tribalism took place in the
Northern Region. Beginning on September 23
s
1966, both troops
and mobs of civilians of Hausa origin began to massacre Ibos
in the North, including the town of Kano again. Reliable
estimates indicated that by October 3 more than 6ne thousand
113
Ibos had been killed. Estimates for themonth of October place
the death toll at twenty to thirty thousand Ibos because of
114
the riots.
Once again many of the Ibos of the North, took flight to'
seek the refuge of Iboland which remained under the control of
Ojukwu. It has been estimated that approximately two million
refugees were given asylum in the East after the last Northern
115
riots. In reply to the acts of the Northerners, many of the
Ibos of the East and the ever swelling refugees sought retribution
against people of Northern origin who were residents of cities
and towns in the Eastern Region. Hundreds of Northerners were
116
killed when they attempted to escape the Ibos 1 wrath, Naturally,
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when such acts became known in other parts of the country I
position of the Ibos in outside oomiTiuniti.es became even more
tenuous than before.
At last all Ibos were called upon to return to the East
from all other areas of the country and all non -Easterners were
117
expelled by Ojukwu' s order, Ojukwu's government seized
approximately one-third of the rolling stock of the Nigerian
Railways, obstructed the movement of all oil products from
Nigeria's main refinery and seized several aircraft belonging to
118
the N i ger i a n Airway s
.
The period from October 1966 to May 1967 was marked by
various abortive attempts to reach some sort of reconciliation
between the Eastern Region and the rest of Nigeria, but no
common denominator could be found. Claims and counter claims
were made by each side against the other and negotiations
steadily deteriorated. Ironically 5 it was the East with the
majority of its population comprised of the Ibos who had in
turn advocated and had the most to gain economically from a
strong central government which finally declared itself to be
119
the independent Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967.
CHARACTER OF THE PROCLAIMED REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA
The original boundaries of the proclaimed Republic of Biafra
120
were identical to those of the former Eastern Region. As
such, its population numbered approximately 14-million and its
territory encompassed en area of roughly 29,000 square miles.
IBOS OF BIAFRA
At the time of Biafra 4 s declaration of independence, it
embraced more people than the African nations of Algeria, the

Congo, Ghana, or Morocco. It contained in addition to the Ibor
approximately five million persons belonging to the minority
tribes of the Efiks, Ekois, Ibibios and Ijaws • The declared
purpose in the seceding from Nigeria had been to protect: the Ibos
from the violent acts carried out in other regions against
the members of that tribe and none of the Biafran minority groups
were active in advocating such a separation. It was pointed out
at the time of secession that "the non-Ibo, reluctant inhabitants
of the. Eastern Region at the best of times, have no enthusiasm
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for becoming citizens of an Ibo- dominated republic."
Since the Ibos occupied the dominant role as the decision-
makers of the new republic it is important to explore their
character in more detail than as set forth earlier. In the
first place, to describe societies merely as tribal does not
i
necessarily simply connote that their members are primative.
Tribe means an ethnic group and "African tribes . . . are as
different from one another as Swedes are from Spaniards or
122
Welshmen are. from Walloons." No one knows for certain the
origins of the Ibos, but anthropologists generally agree that
the Ibo society was not similar to any of the other tribes of
the area. One very interesting theory is advanced by a former
British missionary, G.T.Basden, who feels because of many
similarities in art, speech and community- practices between the
Ibos and the Hebrews , that the Ibos may have migrated from
123
the Nile Valley cenlurries ago. Unlikely as the assertion of
Basden may seem, there is a good deal of support for the
proposition that the Ibos do actively seek to identify themselves
with the modern-da)' Israelis.
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Whatever their origins, once released from Iboland by
modern communications and armed with the education of the
European missionaries, they spread throughout the country's
major urban centers. They strove to become superior to other
tribal groups "as if in some hidden alliance with the Puritan
ethic." It has been said of the Ibo that:
Outside his region the Ibo may be hated or mildly
resented or publicly respected, but he is seldom loved. Like
the Biblical Israelites, with whom the Ibos share some
cultxiral parallels, clannish, enterprising, with an unbending
will that some descri.be as arrogance. Others equate it with
the character of the modern day Israelis, a people the Ibos
admire. 125
Colonel Ojukwu has stated:
There are parallels here. The Israelis are hard working,
enterprising people. They've suffered from pogroms. So have
we. In many ways we share the same promise and the same
problems . 1 26
Only one more examaple of many available will be given to
illustrate the Ibo attitude toward the Israelis.. When meetings
were held in Addia Ababa between the combatants, the Kigerian
representative, Chief Enahoro , derogatorily stated that the
Biafrans were tr3'ing to convince the outside world that "they
are another race of Jews who want to form a state of their own
127
because of oppression by fellow countrymen in Nigeria." The
Biafrans replied by stating that their case had "rarely been put
128
so succinctly."
Many other examples may be put forward to demonstrate the
asserted comparisons of the Ibos to the present day Israelis and
there are many similarities. It is only necessary at this
juncture to note that not only have they been so associated by
some non~Ibo authorities, but more importantly that the leaders
of Biafra actively seek to encourage such indentif ication among
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the members of the tribe.
PHYSICAL ASSETS OF BIAFRA
Taken as a whole, the Eastern Region had been agriculturally
self-sufficient and able to export approximately $70-million of
foodstuffs annually before the outbreak of hostilities. However,
the agricultural surplus of the region did not come from Iboland,
which in even the best of times was an agricultural deficit
section. It was the lands of the minority tribes to the north
129
and east of the Ibo that provided so amply for the region.
Expediency at the very least demanded the inclusion of the
traditional lands of those tribes in the newly formed state in
order to better protect the economic independence of the Ibos
regardless of the attitude toward independence of those peoples.
Agricultural abundance was not the only physical asset of
the region for of even more importance to the Biafrans was
the area's potential as a major petroleum producer in the world
community. Although Nigeria is not generally considered in the
same category as the states of the Kiddle East, it was the
\ 130
world's tenth largest producer of crude oil in 1966. Before
the outbreak of hostilities, crude oil was the largest source
131
of Nigerian foreign exchange earnings. It is initially more
expensive to produce, but its very high quality and low sulphur
132
content have made it attractive to consumer nations. Another
good reason for the growing importance of Nigerian oil in the
world is that:
The Suez crisis in 1956 . . . frightened the major [oil]
producers into reconsidering the merits of Nigerian oil despite
its relatively high production cost. If Nigeria could be
developed as an alternative to Middle Eastern oil, the
Western petroleum industry might be able to weather the
vagaries of Arab nationalism ,
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The large European and American oil companies have a
total investment in Nigeria of over a billion dollars, and
even more important, Nigerian oil production was the fastest
growing in the world --in 1966 alone it increased an incredible'
53 per cent . 1 33
At the time of Biafra secession Britain was dependent upon
Nigerian production for 10 per cent of its crude oil supply.
The Nigerian share of the British petroleum market was expected
134
to increase to 20 per cent by 1972, British firms had
invested over ").;200 -mil lion in Nigerian oil fields which produced
20 . 5 ••mil lion tons in 1966. The other -major participant was the
United States whose private investment in Nigerian oil was
135
approximately $300~rnillion just before war broke out.
What makes the subject of Nigerian petroleum reserves
particularly relevant to an examination of Biafra' s assets is
the fact that in 1966, 67 per cent of Nigeria's oil was derived
137
from fields in the Eastern Region. In addition to being the
center of Nigeria's most developed oil fields, the Biafran city
1 38
of Port Harcourt was the site of Nigeria's only, oil refinery.
Control of such a valuable asset by a new state not only raised
139
the pleasant prospect of a substantial foreign income, but
also provided a useful tool with which it might have been
possible to force both tacit and formal recognition by leading
participants in the world community.
Biafra felt it might be able to force the oil companies to
make royalty payments to its government by monopolizing on the
possible interruption of Kiddle Eastern oil with the outbreak
of the Six Day War which occurred at precisely the same time.
Britain might have had to extend formal recognition as a price
for essential petroleum products otherwise unavailable.
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This most valuable asset to the Biafrans, both ecoi imically
and politically was not located in the J.bo section of Biafra
all, but in the Delta section which was occupied by the "rivers
140
minorities" who had traditionally been resentful of the Ibos.
Once again the need to create an independent viable state with
the greatest prospect of success required that another minority
area was of necessity included in Biafra by the Ibo leaders
without the consent of its peoples. Even had this section
not been the source of the petroleum reserves, it was vitally
important because it was the only area which could provide the
Biafrans with direct access to the sea -- an important fact
if surrounded by a hostile neighbor to the north and west and
mountains to the east, as was the case when secession was declared.
The Shell British Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria
did make a token payment of $700,000 to the Biafran Government
for royalties alleged to be due, but thenLagos responded by
imposing a naval blockade on all oil exports from the East and
141
no more royalties were paid to Biafra. The Six Day War did
not materially affect the long run supply of oil- to Europe and
no formal recognition was forthcoming to the Biafrans by virtue
of the possible availability of its oil reserves. Not only did
no recognition follow from its petroleum interests, but in addition
as Biafra was essentially without a navy, the Federal blockade
was wholly complete denying a source of very necessary foreign
exchange to the new nation.
III. PROGRESS 0?" THE WAR
INITIAL CONFRONTATION
Just three days before Biafra' s independence was declared
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General Gowon attempted to blunt the Ibos' argument for secession
by declaring a federal system to be comprised of twelve states,
one of which would be the East Central that encompassed the
141a
traditional Iboland. These states were to be largely self-
governing, but the Federal Government did reserve the right to
declare a state of emergency and assume control. The Biafrans
flatly rejected the plan. They first pointed out what could be
done by the declaration of a state of emergency as illustrated
by the example of the Western Region in 1962. A second reason
for Biafran rejection of the proposed plan was that the Ibos
would then be restricted to a pov.7er base that was not only
landlocked but overpopulated and economically dependent upon the
rest of Nigeria— a result obviously unacceptable to the aggressive
Ibos unless they could control the central government: a
possibility extremely remote by that time.
When Ojukwu declared Biafra's independence he promised to
"respect all treaties and to assume Eastern Nigeria's share of
all subsisting international debts and obligations," He continued:
We shall faithfully adhere to the Charter of the African Unity
Organization and the United Nations Organization.
It is our intention to remain a member of the British
Commonwealth of Rations in our own right as a sovereign and
independent nation. 142
Gowon replied by stating that the secession was only a move
by a "clique of evil men" and there was no popular support behind
the secession attempt. He then continued to predict that the
Eastern Region would be returned to the Federation by "a police
143
action which should take no more than a few weeks at the most'.'
Despite Gowon* s statement and despite the fact there were "at




stationed on the Eastern Region's northern frontier", no armed
confrontation occurred until well over a month after Ojukwu'
s
declaration. The reason for the Federal delay in carrying out
its public threats was simply that the Biafrans were strongly
favored in terms of relative military strength as between the
participants. Ojukwu was able to brag (and not without some
145
foundation) that he had "the biggest army in black Africa."
INITIAL BIAFRAN AGRESSION
Surprisingly for a state proclaimed for the protection of
the Ibos, it was the Biafrans and not the Federal Military
Government which initiated the military confrontation. Ojukwu
declared he would take military action against the Lagos govern-
ment as he then proceeded to march his forces into the Midwestern
146
Region. Gowon had no alternative but to at least order his
147
army to attack the East and attempt to capture Ojukwu. At
first the fears of the Federal Government appeared to be well
founded, for the Biafrans easily gained control of the entire
Midwest. They continued on into the Western Region and soon
' 148
reached Ore which was only 135 miles east of Lagos. The Biafran
offensive so far into the territory of the Federal Government
certainly appeared to be incompatible with its initially declared
defensive purpose.
"The common interest in minimizing the destruction of values
dictates that they should not be reconstructed through intense
149
coercion or violence." If the Biafrans were the aggressors in
this situation, then their true role in the conflict may not have
been as the general world opinion has been lead to believe. As
Professors McDougal and Feliciana point out in their study
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entitled LAW AMD MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
The appraisal of the objectives of a participant
alleged to have resorted to unlawful coercion would, of
course, present no difficulties if the participant explicitly
and publicly declared its intention to destroy the "territorial
integrity" or "political independence" of its opponent. Such
open and explicit declarations, however, are bound to be
rare. 150
The acts of Biafra constitute one of those rare cases if
examined in the context of the conflict. They were not so blunt
as some Arab governments in the Middle East are prone to be
toward Israel, but soon after Biafra invaded the Midwest, Biafran
leaders made public appeals to the Yorubas to "desert the federal
government and the Nigerian Army and 'liberate' themselves from
151
dominion by the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups/' After the Mid-
west had been seized, the Biafrans then publicly styled themselves
as a "liberation army" and declared that their aim was "to free
the Yorubas of the Western Region from domination by Northern
152 ,
Nigerians." The fact that the I. bos struck the first military
blows from a position of
._
superiority and then made such statemer
while forcefully advancing into their opponent's territory clearly
negates any professions that Biafra 's sole raison d 'etre was
the protection of lbo lives. The true purpose of Biafra '
s
creation appears as a means to join the entire South extra-
juridically. The fact that the Midwest and the West contained
153
all of the remaining known petroleum reserves of Nigeria is
also worthy of consideration. In the South, the fact that the
Ibos would be superior in terms of military strength and population
also makes their motives appear far from the pure one they would
have had the world believe.
It was not surprising that the response of the West which
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had already rejected the Ibo overtures in the recent politic; ]
arena should be the same„.tjo a thr< : ted military invasii
by an Ibo controlled army of Biafra. While there may have been
some initial wavering on the. part of the West toward remaining
a part of Nigeria, when it appeared that any independent
Western action at the time could only lead to becoming a part of
Biafra, then the decision-makers of the Yorubas threw their
weight behind, the Federal Government if for no other reason th< n
simply to save themselves.
THE RESULTING FE1 SRAL OFFENSIVE
Federal resistance soon hardened and the superior military
equipment recently received by the Lagos government began to
tell on the overextended Biafran forces who had not received
the support of the countryside they had expected. The tides of
war changed. By September 20, 1967, Benin, the capita] of t]
1
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Midwest Region, was retaken by the Federal troop's. From that
time to the present, the size of Biafra has been sometimes
agonizingly slowly , but steadily shrinking.
Enugu, the first capital of Biafra, fell to the Federal
155
forces in early October 1967. To the north and west the Lagos
government was in complete control. The Biafrans' one-boat
156
"navy" had been destroyed in the first month and a Federal,
blockade proved to be quite successful. In the early days of
the conflict Biafra had been able to receive logistical support
by land routes through the mountains to the east from Cameroon,
but the Federal trooos had gained control of this means of
157
support by early October. Because of the Federal encirclement,
the only effective means of material support to Biafra was by
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means of airlift. The Federal troops began an attack on Calabar
on October 19, 1967. Once that was taken Biafra becama entirely
158
landlocked and surrounded.
The Federal troops were not the best army by any means in
159
terms of their military efficiency, but even so by January 1,
1968, Gowon felt he could confidently give the order to his
160
governors and military commanders, to end the war in three months
with reasonable expectation that it would be carried out. So
confident were the decision -makers in Lagos at that time that
they publicly offered to cease war operations in order to "discuss




Ojukvu indicated the Biafrans' attitude when he responded
at the end of January by calling for a ceasefire and "uncondititional
negotiations" to end the war . He stcited that to continue the
conflict he needed mostly "money, arms, equipment and ammunition."
The peace negotiations that resulted from these' public offers
failed because Biafrans insisted on absolute sovereignty and
Nigeria on a complete return to the Federation. Despite the
apparent futility of the Biafran chances for victory, the war
continued to drag on.
A STALEMATE DEVELOPS
As the Federal troops advanced, they met more and more
resi.stence the closer they came to the heart of Iboland. They
responded by devoting long periods to complete inactivity despite
their by now considerable numerical and material superiority in
the field and complete military dominance of the air space. Both




foundered on the single point of sovereignty.
The major Biafran city of Port: Harcourt fell to the Federal
163
forces by the middle of May 1968. By September the Biafran
controlled territory had been reduced to approximately 5,000
164
square miles and its population to less than 8-million. Even
in the face of obviously insurmountable military odds and while
in the throes of ever increasing .starvation, the Biafrans
continued to resist. The Nigerian offensive had slowed so much
that for three weeks in late August and early September, the
Lagos government reported it had captured Aba, }'et by mid-
September still had yet to show a clear victory in that battle.
By February 1969, it could be stated that the "last major federal
drive was September 17, 1968, at Owerri. The Second Division
had not expanded its perimeter beyond Onitsha since the capture
165
of that city March 21, 1968."
On April 1, 1969, Nigeria claimed it had begun a new drive
to end the war , but on the fifth of that month 'it was reported
166
that Biafran forces had baited the drive. The administrative
headquarters of Biaf ra , Umuhia, was captured on April 24 leaving
only approximately 2,500 square miles of territory to the Biafrans,
167
one air-strip at Uli-lhiala and one town, Orlu, Despite these
successes, the so-called "new drive" was so i.neffective that it
could be reported by mid -May that the Nigerians had still made
no significant progress in ten months toward the most important
military objective of the war, the Biafran air-strip at Uli-
Ihiala--even though this objective was the only remaining source
168
of military and relief supplies for the encircled government.
Even more humiliating for Lagos was the fact that the Biafrans
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at the onci of April had recaptured Owerri, formerly the fifth
169
largest city in the Eastern Region, and by the end of May had
"rolled the Nigerians back to within 20 miles of the key oil
170
terminal city of Port Harcourt."
In addition to being able to obtain no more than a stalemate
on the ground, the Federal Government was stunned by air raids
on key Nigerian positions by an apparently "instant" Biafran Air
force of four or five planes which attacked with rockets and
171
bombs commencing May 2 5, 1969. To fully appreciate the surprise
of the Nigerians it should be noted that the Biafrans' "air
force" had been considered out of operation since August 1967
172
when its sole B-26 had been destroyed,
FUTURE PROGRESS OF THE WAR
At the pore-sent time the conflict continues with no military
resolution in sight between the combatants. The Federal forces
have regained all the minority areas of Biafra and some of the
Ibo territory, but they seem to be completely uhable to progress
into the heart of Iboland or even to destroy the Uli air-strip.
The Biafran forces on the other hand, have such limited logistical
support, such a diminished territorial base and such limited'
population resources that it is extremely unlikely they can do
more than launch an occasional limited offensive. Regardless
of their restricted position, the Biafrans have not given up,
and in fact talk with a degree of realism of a war that could
continue for five or more years. One writer was prompted to
comment that if the conflict "were to boil down to a war of the






STARVATION RESULTING FROM THE WAR AND RELIT;;!' 1 g [S
Biafra had suffered steady military reverses, but even more
disastrous to the nation were the deaths of substantial segments
of its population due to starvation and malnutrition. This
acute situation arose primarily by virtue of the complete federal
encirclement and by the loss of the major food producing areas.
Added to those factors was a failure to produce sufficient crops
on land within Biafran control because of unusually adverse
weather conditions and a disruption of productive capacity caused
by wartime conditions.
It is essential to note at this point that "before the
Nigerian Civil War . . . malnutrition was unknown in this part
17/!
of West Africa." It is not the intent of this discussion to
set forth in minute detail the non -combat deaths resulting from
lack of proper diet as that feature ha's been played upon more
amply in the press than can be done in the scope* of this paper.
Suffice it to say that at times the mortality rate has reached
staggering proportions which cannot be wholly dismissed without
an explanation of its causes.
STARVATION AND MALNUTRITION APPEAR
By early June 1968, it became evident that substantial
segments of the population of the East were suffering from the
lack of a proper diet and conditions were likely to become much
worse. The first food and medicines to be flown into Biafra
were obtained by Ojukwu's government by means of flights from
air fields in Portugual and the Portuguese islands of Sao Thome
175
and Fernando Po . It soon became evident that Biafra simply
did not have the means to provide adequate supplies of non -military
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essentials, Lagos at first refused to recognize the fact that
176
relief was necessary to sustain civilians. When all parties
finally did realize the problem, it was of such magnitude that
the combatants were individually unable to provide the logistical
support of the war devastated areas. The International Committee
of the Red Gross began landing planeloads of relief supplies in
177
Lagos in June 1968, in what was. to become the largest relief
operation undertaken by that organization since the end of
178
World War II.
By mid -June it was reported that almost universally refugee
children were suffering from a protein deficiency condition the
Africans have named kwashiokor. In many cases the condition is
fatal, but even if death does not result, it "almost, always leaves
17 9
its victims mentally and physically retarded." Once reports
began to record the plight of tbe women and children, the
Nigerians were forced to recognize the existence of the conditions
and to at least make outward attempts to cooperate with the
relief officials,
INITIAL RELIEF EFFORTS
Despite the fact that the need for relief efforts became
increasingly acute with each passing day, each of the combatants
sought to maximize his position by monopolizing on the destruction
of the most important of all human values -- life itself, especially
that of children, The Federal Government had military control
over all air space and threatened to shoot dov.m all unauthorized
aircraft travelling into Biafra, The Federal decision-makers
demanded that ail relief efforts vjere to go through Lagos and
180
be subjected to Nigerian control. Such an arrangement placed
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the Biafrans in a dependent position relative to their enemi
'
and subject to capricious acts of Lagos, Also the Federal
decision-makers wanted to prevent any international acts that
would reinforce Biafra's claims to sovereignty.
The Federal position could be successful only if the Biafrans
were desperate enough to accept it. They did not despite the
suffering of their people, Ojukwu played upon . folklore and native
fears to convince tie civilians that the Federal authorities would
181
poison the food under the Federal arrangement. Deaths continued
and the pressure on Nigeria from the indignant world community
increased. Pope Paul VI made a public statement at the Vatican
on Jul}' 22 , 1968, that the Catholic relief agency, Caritas, would
182
fly aid into Biafra contrary to the Federal demands. The
Nigerians could do little but retreat from their position. At
that time the shooting down of an obviously neutral Red Cross or
Caritas plane would have been a much worse alternative than
allowing the relief flights.
Although both the Biafrans and the Ibo refugees in retaken
Federal territory suffered the most from the lack of sufficient
food and medicines, the Biafran decision-makers still sought' to
exploit world sympathy to promote their exclusive interests. Not
only did Ojukwu refuse to accept aid channelled through Nigerian
hands, he also refused to accept supplies • shi pped overland
through Federal held territory even though nutritional experts
were in agreement that such a course was the only one that would
183
insure adequate relief. Ojukwu claimed that the corridors would
be used by the Federal troops to their military advantage. He




from outside Nigeria When this proposal was refused by Lagos,
he then refused to accept daytime airlifts by claiming that the
Federal planes would "tailgate" and destroy the only remaining
185
airstrip. Such an assertion was without justifiable foundation
as Federal planes had been singularly unsuccessful in destroying
that Strip despite their numerous attempts on its known location.
Also the Nigerians had already shown they sought to avoid the
adverse world opinion that would have ensued from such acts when
they agreed to relief flights in the first place.
B1AFRANS LI MIT RELIEF TO CIVILIANS
The real reason for the requirement that all relief flights
were to be flown only at night was to use those flights and the
cover of darkness to obtain desperately needed arms. The arms
flights were mingled with and became indistinguishable from the
relief planes. During the week beginning September 15, 1968, it
was reported that each night Biafra received a dozen relief
planes and a half dozen arms shipments from fields in Gabon, the
Ivory Coast and Lisbon. An average of 100 tons of food and
medical supplies also yielded thirty to forty tons of arms and
186
ammunition nightly. Regardless of the military advantages to
the Biafran army of such an arrangement, relief officials
continued to assert that 100 tons of civilian supplies a day was
not even enough to reduce the escalating death rate. A projected
need of 500 tons a day was felt to be the nimimum to provide a
bare subs i stance --a total far beyond the capabilities of any
187
airlift under conditions at that time.
The Federal government soon realized Ojukwu's predicament
and. accordingly modified their original insistance on complete
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control, to a proposal of overland "mercy corridors" by means of
which the Red Cross could truck in the large quantities of
supplies needed. The offer in its final form included the
provision that: the supplies were to be handled exclusively by
the Red Cross and the corridors would remain neutral by virtue of
188
observers from members of the OAU. It could be certain that
while these land routes would in all likelihood solve the situation
of the civilians, it would also immeasurably aid the Nigerian
military in other ways. With all civilian supplies using the
land routes , any planes could be presumed to be military and
subjected to attack by the Nigerian Air Force, soon drying up
the already limitied military capabilities of Biafra.
To avoid the sanctioning process of the world community of
189
forcing acceptance of such a plan on the leaders of Biafra , the
word -symbol "genocide" emerged in a Bi'afran attempt to shift the
burden of conduct examination to the Federal Military Government,
The at least temporary effectiveness of such a course of action
allowed Biafra to continue as a combatant, but it was paid, for
in untold numbers of civilian deaths which resulted from the lack
190
of adequate transportation of food and medicine,
BIAFRAN USE OF WORD SYMBOLS
An unfortunately common practice of acceptance of the use
of word-symbols to depict a particular situation without further
investigation or def initlon in 1 ight of the underlying motives
is always at best a superficial and dangerous course of action.
Ojukwu had resorted to such emotionally descriptive practices
many times in attempts to maximize the values Biafrans sought to




incorrect when it is realized that more than one-third of its
population was non-Ibo. Another instance of this practice was
in the declaration that Biafra was established to protect the
Ibos from the violent acts of the other Nigerians. Then less
than six weeks after Biafra declared its independence, it
clearly assumed the role of an aggressor against the Yoruba regioi
of Nigeria claiming to be the "liberator" of those "oppressed"
by the North. The circumstances of the eventual defeat of Ojukwu's
forces in the West and Midwest clearly indicated just how much
"liberation" those peoples sought.
The use of the word-symbol genocide was doubly appropriate
for the Biafrans* purposes. In the first place genocide had the
trememdous connotations resulting form the tragic deaths of the
Jews in Nazi Germany and secondly the Ibos had continually sought
to portray themselves in the context of the Nigerian equivalent
of the "Jewish people". While in the minds of Stome anthropologists
such as Basden, the Ibos may be descended from Hebrew stock,
there is actually only slight evidence of such a fact and little
support from other authorities. The Ibos had been spread
throughout Nigeria, but they had neither the historical origins
nor the magnitude of the Jewish Diaspora no matter how much they
sought to culturally identify themselves with those practicing
the Jewish religion. There was a striking similiarity between
the Ibo claims to continued tribal affiliation regardless of
191
Nigerian residence and the Zionist appeals of present day Israel
192
to be the "national home of all Jewish people.
Mo matter where the Ibos went throughout the country, they




addition to "special subscriptions" ~- really taxes to advance
193
the Ibo position in the Nigerian community. When Ojukwu issued
his call to all Ibos to return to Iboland, he was in a sense
establishing a "national home" for the Ibos. As Ojukwu is
194
reportedly an avid student of Israel it was undoubtedly no
accident when the leaders of Biafra sought to identify their
195
case with "the Israelis who [sic] • we admire."
Obviously Biafra employed the word -symbol genocide to preserve
its independence and to strengthen its appeal in the world
community. In so doing it sought to obscure the fact that most
of the civilian deaths from lack of adequate relief supplies was
the result of the Biafran decision -makers intransigence. The
appeal to anti -Nazi and Jewish sentiment in the same manner as
the highly successful Zionists have done was meant to replace
1 i >o
emotionally charged wards for actual facts.
ANALYSIS OF GENOCIDE CLAIMS *
In the actual context of Nigeria, genocide was an unsxipportable
claim on two levels because; (1) juridically it wa,s nationally a
non sequitur ; and (2) actual investigations by independent
international observer teams exonerated Nigeria's military conduct
in the war zones,
The word genocide was first applied to describe the attempted
197
extermination of the Jews by Nazi Germany and can be described
as "probably the most tragic event of the present century. All
moral individuals of whatever national or religious identification
198
share revulsion at those who perpetrated these crimes," The
most comprehensive definition of genocide is found in Article II
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
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of Genocide which was unanimously adopted by the United Nations
199
General Assembly December 9, 1949. For the present purposes.,
however, it may be more simply described as "the deliberate
200
destruction of national, religious or ethnic groups."
A typical example of the statements made by the proponents
of the genocide claims was such as follows:
We are all aware that the • Nigerian armies which have
encircled the Ibo heartlands are heavily armed with British
and Russian weapons. But it can hardly be doubted, in view
of the reports from the war front, that they are also strongly
armed with the conviction of fanatics, that as they kill
Biafrans , they are destroying a human "cancer" which they
describe by the term "Ibo . " 201 (emphasis added)
The italicized portions of this statement demonstrate how the
genocide claimants often used the terms "Biafran" and "Ibo"
synonomously to describe the victims of the alleged deliberate
destruction. Although the major tribe of the region was the
Ibo, it has been noted that Biafra was also the homeland of many
minority tribes. Regardless of the claim that the victims of
the allege! genocide were„ Biafrah s , no claim was' ever made that
the Federal Government intended to destroy the minorities. That
was because any foundation for the genocide claims had to rest
upon the preseccssion discrimination and riots which had been
against the Ibos only. There could have been no historical
support for the entire Biafran nation which included non-Ibo
segments. Therefore, the claims of genocide against Biafrans
was simply due to imprecise language and unclear perception of
the facts by those who thought in such terms
.
VALIDITY OF GENOCIDE CLAIMS AS APPLIED TO NON-BlAFRAN IBOS
If genocide was being practiced, then it must have been with
the intent to destroy in whole or in part the Ibo people as a
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group. It then became necessary to discover if it was the whole
or only a part of the Ibos who were in danger and if it was not
the whole then to identify the part. The position of the Ibos
in the Federal territory refuted any basis for the charge that
it was the Ibos as a whole who were the subject of genocide by
the Lagos government.
After the atrocities in the .fall of 1966 when Ojukwu issued
his call for all Ibos to return to their homeland, an estimated
two million responded. One very important fact that was ignored
or simply overlooked by the genocide claimants was the fact that
not a 1 1 Ibos " re turn ed " to,, the ..East: . Many remained where they had
made their homes in the various parts of Nigeria • If the group
that was threatened was to be adequately defined then it was
necessary to examine the treatment of the non-Biafran Ibos who
were the most subject to Migerian control.
In October 1968, United States Senator Edward V/« Brooke
stated on the basis of his own personal knowledge that "there
are more than 38,000 Ibos living in Lagos itself at the present
time; they are well, prosperous, and unharmed. There are Ibos
serving in the Government of Nigeria, one of the foremost of
202
whom is in fact the Nigerian Ambassador to the United States."
Another reliable source pointed out that there were millions of
Ibos in the non -Eastern sections of the country, over one-half
million i.n the Midwest alone. They were allowed to go about
their normal business, even in such nlaces as the Northern city
203
of Kano where the worst anti-Ibo riots had occurred . An Ibo
of cabinet rank was on the staff of the Governor of Kano in charge




in the disturbances." There were a considerable number of Ibos
in the Federal Government such as: 642 Ibo police officers in
the Nigerian police force; the permanent Secretary of the Federal
Ministry of Industries was an Ibo; another was the Executive
secretary of the Feelers 1 Inland Revenue Department. In addition,
2.05
the Nigerian Ambassadors to Belgium and India were also Ibos,
The Nigerians bad also established a "considerable department
. . .
headed by senior Ibo officials, to devise olans for
206
reincorporation of the Ibos of the reconquered areas."
These facts quite clearly indicated that genocide was
obviously not the practice of the Federal Government against the
Ibos who remained in the Federal territory. Thus, if not all of
the Ibos were in danger, it could have been only the part which
was the Ibo population of Biafra who were the subjects of
genocide. Yet this area was by definition subject to /the exclusive
control of the Biafran decision-makers and it was physically
impossible for the Nigerians to carry out a systematic program
of destruction against those people. ,
REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER TEAMS
The one area in which genocide against Biafran Ibos could
be practiced was in those areas of Biafra taken by the Federal
army. Because the claim of genocide had been so often made in
the world arena, the Federal Government in September 1968,
invited representatives of the United Nations Secretary General,
the Organization of African Unity, Britain, Canada, Poland, and
Sweden to observe in person the military operations and refugee
207
treatment by the Nigerian armed forces. The members of these
inspection teams siabsequently filed reports covering different

sections of the territory recaptu ed by the Federal forces.
The first report, filed by Major General Henry Alexander
of the United Kingdom, Major Genera] W.A. Milroy of Canada and
Major General Arthur Raab of Sweden, dated October 2, 196", was
typical of all subsequent reports. The observers reported that
the)'' had visited with no restrictions of any sort to their
movements or investigations, "front line positions, military
units and headquarters, villages, market places, medical and
food distributing stations, refugee camps and major cities and
208
towns." The observers "talked to officers, soldiers, local
inhabitants, refugees, members of the civil Administration,
209
Police, Red Cross officials and missionaries," The summary of
the findings of this first report was that " [t] here is no
evidence of an.)' intent by the Federal troops to destroy the
Ibo people of their property, and the iuse of the term genocide
'210
is in no way justified."
j
A second report by the observer team which included Mr.
Neils Gussing of the United Nations, Colonel Alfons Olkiewie of
\
Poland and representatives of the Organization of African Unity
was filed regarding observations during the period from October
5 through 10, 1968. This report summarized:
There is no evidence supoorting the allegation of
genocide by Federal forces against the Ibo people. There-
are a number of Ibo people alive and well behind the Federal
lrnes. This speaks for itself. However the majority of the
Ibos who lived in the area have not yet returned, 211
A third report was filed by the members of the observation team
comprised of representatives from Canada, Poland, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom covering the period from October 15 to 18,
with regard to observations of the retaken Ibo areas west of the
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Niger River. This report concluded: "We did not see or hear any
212
evidence o f gen o c i d e .
"
FAILURE OF GENOCIDE CLAIMS DOES NOT END WAR
When information regarding the conditions of non-Biafran
Ibos and the results of the observer teams' reports were
published to refute Ojukwu's claims of genocide and the emotions
it at least temporarily evoked, the actions of the Biafran
decision -makers could no longer be covered by that convenient
word symbol. Nigeria periodically offered to allow daylight relief
213
flights and the use of land corridors under neutral observation.
Relief officials and impartial foreign observers continually
insisted that the only means of providing adequate relief to
the starving within Biafra could be accomplished by the means
214
suggested by the Federal officials.
If in fact, the plight of the Biafran people was so terrible,
and the claims of genocide were not true, then the question that
must: be asked is why did those people not act through their
institutions to replace the decision-makers who were pursuing
such a destructive course and then seek to end the conflict?
It is submitted that the combatants would have reached a settle-
ment long ago by which Biafra would have again become an integral
part of Nigeria except for two distinct but interrelated factors.
One reason for the continued resistance of the Biafran peoples
is that, while there may have been no validity to the claims of
genocide, the unnecessary destruction of human values by both
sides, especially the Federal forces, created an attitude among
the Biafrans as expressed by Sir Louis Hbanefo when he said:




to pay, then we cannot escape it." A second reason is that
there are many non-combatant participants also engaged in this
conflict. These participants are seeking to maximize their own
values with little or no regard for the destruction of the values
of the combatants.
ATROCITIES OF THE COMBATANTS CONTRIBUTING TO CONTINUATION OF TH
ARMED CONFLICT
Soon after the actual armed conflict commenced, the
International Committee of the Red Cross reported that both
sides "gave assurances of a desire to respect the Geneva Conventions
216
protecting war victims," Despite such professions of their
intent to adhere to the "rules of war", both sides in this war,
as is generally true in any war, did not sufficiently restrain
their actions. There were many cruel attacks not only on opposing
217
troops, but also on the civilians who according to one Federal
Army Commander "are neutral. They just want to be left alone.
They have realized that in all the battles eventually they are
218
the only victims." .
One writer caustically remarked that:
In truth this was very much an African war in which '
genocide is seldom the main motive, but often the ultimate
result. Traditionally, the victor in an African war did what
was expected by both sides: he looted everything that could
be carried, burned the rest, and killed all the able bodied
men and frequently "the women and children too.
The Nigerian war is being fought instinctively within
this traditional framework and with all the modern weapons
.... 219
Such an indictment may be unduly critical of the combatants and
the generalization of African concepts of war unfair in the light
of the conduct in many non-African wars, but at times it seemed





CONDUCT OF . LES OF COMBATANTS
When the Biafran troops were forced to withdraw from the
Midwest, an eyewitness reported: "Those who resisted [Biafran
military appropriation of food from the marketplace] were shot:
on the snot and Biafran troops left behind them the bodies of
220
hundreds of marketwomen sprawled 'in front of their stalls."
That the conduct of the Federal troops was not better is illustrated
by an example related by a Catholic priest, Brother Aloysius
,
regarding his personal experiences:
In the hospital outside Enugu, they [the Nigerian troops]
shot all 14 Biafran nurses who stayed behind, then went down
the wards killing the patients as well. It was the same thing
at Port Harcourt . 221
Of course such recitals could possibly be dismissed as only
isolated instances, but there have been such an enormous number
v
of accounts of similiar acts by the military of ;both sides that
the above can only be classified as typical examples,
DIMINISHED VIOLATIONS BY THE ARMIES
\
Had the relative strengths and the power bases of the
combatants remained essentially equal, all. indications are that
both sides would have continued their atrocities against both
civilian and military victims. Such was not to be the case
however, as the Biafrans were forced into a position almost
completely devoted, to defending Biafran people. The Federal
troops although on the offensive (and at least occasionally
advancing) were later subjected to the close scrutiny of the
observer teams. These teams were a strong restraining force
on the actions of the troops as their behavior was constantly
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subjected to observation and reports. It was generally noted
that the behavior of the Federal troops was not as exemplary as
222
it should have been, but public observation brought about
223
summary punishment for at least the gross misconduct in the field.
With the resultant decrease of atrocities by the armies of
both sides, the steady shrinking of Biafra, the starvation, and
the general refutation of the claims of genocide, peace prospects
favored the Federal Military Government. The first part of
calendar year 1969 should have seen the Biafran decision-makers
either accepting the best possible peace term;; they could obtain
or their replacement by a dissatisfied Biafran people, A settle-
ment did not occur largely because of the inexcusable actions of
the Nigerian Air Force.
CIVILIAN BOMBINGS BY NIGERIAN AIR FORCE
From the time of their loss of their only plane until April
1969, the Biafrans had' no military air capabilities. The Federal
forces on the other hand, had received large numbers of KIG
fighters and Ilushin bombers from the Soviets who also "allowed"
22 4
Egypt to provide trained pilots to operate these aircraft.
Unfortunately for both sides the Nigerian Air Force did' not,
or was not able to, restrict its pilots to attacks on essentially
military targets. In the early stages of the conflict, attacks
were made on civilian targets in both Iboland and the minority
areas of Biafra. At the time of secession the Federal Government
had hoped that the minority tribes would form a fifth column in
Biafra, but the result of the indiscriminate air attacks was to
make the minorities fear both sides, Their lack of assistance to




even the non-Ibo areas of Biaf] i, The Nigerians should have
recognized the fact that non-essential destruction of values in
war inversely affects the amount of military effort required to
obtain any objectives. If they did not realize such a principle
before, then they should have learned it from the Biafra minority
experience
.
Instead, commencing in early 1969, the Nigerian Air Force
greatly increased its attacks on the civilian population within
Biafra. These attacks gave considerable credence to the claims
that Nigeria sought the destruction of the Ibos even if the
rebel decision -makers should have sought peace and also revived
the spector of genocide once again, at least in the eyes of the
Biafran people.
On February 7, 1969, about noon , a Nigerian fighter -bomber
bombed and strafed a market place in the Biafran village of
Umuohiagu;200 to 300 civilians were killed, Anotther bomb was
226
dropped on a maternity clinic killing fifteen women and children.
In another example of these senseless air raids, on February 24,
1969, Federal planes bombed a well marked Red Cross hospital, a
227
market place, a clinic for convalescents and a Red Cross vehicle.
One other example of the type of attacks that were carried out
occurred on February 26, 1969, when a Nigerian Ilushin attacked
the market in the Biafran village of Ozu-Aban which was located
at least fifteen miles from the front lines of the war. A
228
minimum of 120 civilians were killed, mostly women and children,
These examples are cited only to illustrate the gene::, 1
character of the bombings which occurred day after day in the
first months of 1969. All the while the vital Uli air strip
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continued to function nightly, as it had only received negligible
229
damage from Nigerian planes during the same period,
had a concentrated effort been directed at this target, no
arms or supplies could have arrived in Biafra. Then the Biafrans
would have been forced at the very least to accept the more
effective relief corridors. Instead, the air attacks on civilians
destroyed much of the world S3rnnathy for the Federal cause,
230
threatened the Nigerian military supplies from Great Britain,
and of most importance, the bombings reinforced the Biafrans'
determination to continue to resist despite the overwhelming
odds a ga in s t th em.
.
General Gowon initially denied that any attacks had been
carried out against civilians —perhaps because he was powerless
to stop the Egyptian pilots. But it was a matter that could not:
i
be concealed and comments appeared such as this excerpt from, an
editorial in the New York Times:
There is no doubt that the Egyptian mercenaries flying
soviet planes go deliberately for the congested village markets,
town centers, and the Red Cross symbol on hospitals and aid
stations while meticulously avoiding defended Biafran military
targets. 231
The British Parliament threatened to stop all its military aid
to the Nigerian Government because of the bombings . United States
President Hixon sent: Professor C, Clyde Ferguson, Jr., to
investigate the conduct of the war and
^
the prospects for peace.
Professor Ferguson visited both Biafra and Nigeria and clearly
analyzed the results of Nigeria's bombings when he commented as
follows
:
A tremendous determination has been made to li.ve or die
together. Kost of this, I think, can be attributed to the
bombing In speaking to a number of persons, it: was apparent

61
that this has been the one factor more than anything else,
that has given an extraordinary kind of unity. 232
General Gowon finally conceded on March 31, 1969, that
"some" civilian targets in Biafra had been hit "by error" and
"numbers of civilians killed, " but bo concluded that the air
233
attacks would continue as long as they "were militarily useful."
Since that time, the air attacks on civilian targets have decreased,
but the psychological results created have been disastrous to
peace efforts: not only in terms of lives destroyed by the raids,.
but even more important in creating among those surviving Biafrans
such a suspicion of Nigerian motives that any peace proposals
which offer: less than complete independence are categorically
rejected. Mainly because of the bombings it is most likely that
the Biafran decision-makers will continue to resist as long as
they have the slightest means and in sp doing the}7 will continue
v
to have the support of their people.





The second major reason for the continuation of the war in
\
Nigeria is the fact that while the actual fighting is being done
by individuals of Biafra and Nigeria with the assistance of
some few mercenaries, many other nations, either individually or
in groups, seeking no maximize their own values have become
participants in the conflict through their support for one si.de
or the other, The ultimate result of their intervention has
been to destroy in large part the vol 1 -being, wealth, power,




Several multinational organizations have in varying degrees
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either al ted to, or hav< been called upon, to intercede
between the combatants while others have limited their participation
solely to relief efforts. While it cannot be said they have- had
no effect on the course of the war, the efforts to achieve a
peaceful solution and a return to a "one Nigeria" have singularly
failed to p r ov id e a s o 1u t ion
.
UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
The United Nations through UNESCO and the International
Committee of the Red Cross have limited their participation in
the conflict to that of attempting to provide relief to the
refugees and wounded who are the ultimate products of the war.
The United Nations has been called upon several times to play a
larger role to attempt to achieve peace, but Secretary General U
Thant has publicly stated that his position on Biafra "is guided
2 34
by the Organization of African Unity, and will continue to be."
To this dote he has followed that policy and the'United Nations
has not expanded its role to include that of a peace maker.
The International Committee of the Red Cross has acted solely
as a humanitarian organization and throughout the conflict has
remained scrupulously neutral as is necessary to its effective
operation. It has solely devoted its efforts toward attempting
to maintain the well-being of all individuals to the heat of its
ability by -providing relief. The contribution by these organizations
has been to reduce the level of warfare and destruction o f human
values by decreasing the degree of animosity between the combatants,
aiding those suffering fro i war, and by providing an impartial
objective arte ter to weigh the claims of the combatants relating
to conduct of the war.

O [MONWEALTH OF NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
Nigeria is a member of both the Commonwealth of Nations and
of the Organization of African Unity, Biafra actively soughl
membership in both of these organizations, but so far has boo
unsuccessful in becoming admitted to either, Both of these
associations represent multinational efforts to achieve common
values of their members through a- mutual institution. Neither
has purported to replace the United Nations, but each acts as a
supplement in which the interests of its individual states are
presumed more similar • Members of both the Commonwealth and of
the OAU have had an inclusive interest in settling the present
civil war and have boon active advocates of a peaceful solution.
The Commonwealth of Nations was established in 1965 on the
voluntary association of former British, colonies throughout the
world. It includes among its twenty-eight members ten., ind< p ndent
states of black Africa, but it has not proven to be a particularly
successful association in the eyes of those Africans. Regard Iocs
of the more cosmopolitan appeal of the Commonwealth, the primary
Western cower in black Africa has been France throueh its
2 35
fourteen member Communal African and Malagasy Organization, If
the Commonwealth could have obtained a peaceful settlement of
a civil war in one of its African members, it would "nave gained
much of the African respect it was lacking by virtus of Britain's
former colonial association with white racist Rhodesia and South
Africa
.
The Commonwealth Secretary General, Arnold Smith of Canad .
arranged a peace conference between the combatants to be held at
Kampala, Uganda, in the late spring of 1968, and also offered to
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raise a peace force to observe any ceasefire between the opposing
236
armies. After these discussions were completed, neither of
the combatants had retreated from its original position. No'thii
permanent was accomplished by the Commonwealth and it has now
essentially retreated from the arena.
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has played a much
more active role in attempting to- resolve the war, but to date
the results of its efforts have also been negligible. This
regional institution was created for the purpose of promoting
in the world community a unified effort of the independent
African nations. These states have sought to maximize their values
in a region endowed with vast human and natural resources, but
lacking a population enlightened in European concepts or possessed
of adequate skills to exploit their natural assets. Most of the
colonial forms of government have been withdrawn, but many
powerful residual effects remain. The purpose of the OAU is to
promote the (at time" impatient) goals of Africans within a frame-
work created by colonial powers in a world still largely dominated
by those powers.
At stake in the Biafran conflict for the OAU was its own unity
Any positive results could not but help this organization which
has so far been largely ineffectual in obtaining its declared
objectives,, The attack of the Nigerian civil war on the OAU was
even more basic, for what was happening in Nigeria was also a
threat very real to many of its other members. Really at stake
was an old principle with a new meaning --• the right to self-
determination. The African states had only won their first
round when they gained independence from the colonial powers.
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Now they were facing a second: namely the demands of the many
ethnic groups of Africa to. shape their own institutions without
being inflexibly bound to the maintenance of the territorial
integrity created by the Europeans in order to maximize European
2 37
wealth. Some of the members of the OAU who are burdened with
tribal imbalances similar to Nigeria* s, or whose tribes are split
by European drawn frontiers, include Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya
and the Sudan, Ruanda and Burundi;, Cameroun and Dahomey, Uganda,
238
Zambia, Mauretania and Togoland,
It was in the interests of each of the members of the OAU to
maintain the status quo as their individual and collective
existence depended upon it. Then it was not unexpected that
with the Congo still fresh in their minds, all OAU members
initially voted to condemn the Biafran secession. The resolution
expressed "trust and confidence" in the Federal Government of
Nigeria and vowed to send a top level mission to Lagos to assure
the government of the OAU's desire for "the territorial integrity,
239
unity and peace of Nigeria."
\
The first OAU efforts to resolve the .conflict were based
on the premise that peace could only be achieved if the East'
renounced its secession. This one-sided approach caused Biafran
decision-makers to denounce the initial OAU peace efforts as
240 ••
"stage managed." This out-of-hand rejection by Biafra of OAU
proposals indicated Ojukwu did not fear sanctions the OAU might
be able to impose, Biafra was already encircled and being
subjected to the almost maximum coercion that could be imposed
by Africans. Only one direction was left for the OAU if its name
was to be more than symbolic.
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The members of the OAU soon began to foresee even more
immediate and serious problems confronting them, especially in
those countries neighboring Nigeria. The possibility of other
internal euruptions had an effect on their business climate which
needed substantial outside investment. The war was felt to
reflect adversely on the degree of political stability and enlighten'
ment in black Africa. Finally, it reinforced the position of the
often condemned white racist elements of South Africa, Rhodesia
and the Portuguese territories who have continually maintained
that native Africans are not ready for self-rule. In response
to these pressures which continued to grow, the OAU softened its
original position so that by September 1968, it adopted a resolution
calling for "a cessation of hostilities and general amnesty for
241 . -
all who took up arms in the Biafran cause." (emphasis added)
Despite its change of attitude, the OAU has remained unsuccessful
in achieving any progress toward a solution. It\ has no sanctions
it may employ against Biafra. Any that it may be able to use to
force Lagos to accent less than a form of united Nigeria would
only be to subvert the power of the decision-makers of the OAU's
constituant states by encouraging tribalism.
PARTICIPATION BY NON-COMBATANT NATION -STATES
Any major event in one nation has some import in other states
in the world community, i.ts extent primarily dependent upon the
degree of mutual expectations shared by individuals of those
states. These persons in turn through their political
institutions are constantly seeking to maximize their base values,
thus creating interaction between government institutions. The
Biafran conflict is no exception and the role of participant
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nations other than the combatants ranges on a continuum from
incidental passive hardship to considered, active contributions
of military supplies to combatants to conduct the war.
PASSIVE PARTICIPANTS
An extreme example of the extensive effects of the Nigerian
civil' war on ether nations in the world can be illustrated, by
the case of Iceland, By December 1967, Iceland began to suffer
from a severe economic crisis resulting from a variety of causes.
One of the major factors contributing to her financial difficulty
was the fact that Iceland's major export is stockfish and the
Eastern Region of Nigeria had previously purchased large quantities
of this commodity. The Nigerian blockade of the coast in the
early days of the war prevented the delivery and sale of a large
part of Iceland's annual autumn shipments of dried cod, Hew
markets were not immediately available ' and substantial foreign
242
exchange was lost. t
Other countries not actively involved in the outcome initially
benefited from the war such as Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Italy
and the Netherlands whose citizens derived economic benefits from
the private sales of arms to the belligerants . When the war -had
continued for more than a year without an end definitely in sight,
and combined with the large losses of human life, the wealth
received from these arms sales became of lesser importance than
the destruction these arms caused . One by one each of these
countries ceased its supply to the combatants by the revocation
of export licenses. By August 1968, only those participants
actively interested in the outcome of the conflict remained as
243
the sources of military supplies.
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Other passive participants in the war consisted of the
majority of the members of the Organization of African Unity
who although they had considerable interest in the outcome of the
conflict, restricted their participation solely to resolutions
within the OAU and supported the attempts to resolve the conflict
by that organization. Their total active participation in
contributing to the level of combat has been very limited -- only
the dubious contribution to Biafra resulting from formal recognition
by four African states and the more valuable use of airfields in
244
Gabon and the Ivory Coast for military supplies to Biafra,
Ho African nation has provided arms, men, supplies or
economic assistance to bolster the armies of either of the
combatants. Unfortunately for the combatants such a "hands off"
attitude is not uniformly the case of nations outside the African
continent. With good justification there has been a continually
growing resentment on the part of black African leaders with
regard to participation by non-African nations Without whose
active support the civil war in Nigeria could never have obtained
either the magnitude or the duration which it has achieved,
ACTIVE PARTICIPANTS
UNITED STATES . The assignment of categories creates arbitrary
distinctions that are unduly pronounced in the marginal areas.
The role of the United States of Ajnerica in the present conflict
is just such a case. While it has made no secret of its attitude
supporting the proposition of "one Nigeria", it has not contributed
any military materials to either combatant, nor has it allowed
any export licenses for arms sales from private individuals to
245
Nigeria or Biafra. Such a position is especially commendable
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when it is considered that before the war, the United States
supplied about 16 per cent of all Nigerian imports and had
committed (and spent) $225-million on Nigerian development, more
246
than has been given to any other African state. The only
official UnitedStates participation in the actual conflict has
been limited to "fact finding" missions of government officials
and members of Congress visited upon the decision-makers of both
sides .
What makes the United States an active participant in the
Nigerian arena is its involvement in the relief efforts conducted
by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Joint
Church Aid. Individuals in the United States have contributed
$10-million since the beginning of the relief effort, and government
contributions have now reached $65-million. This total of $75-
million has amounted to 49 per cent ofi all expenses of the
247..
international relief efforts in Nigeria and Biafra. United States
attempts at settlement of the differences between the combatants
have been restricted almost exclusively to attempts to expedite
\
the delivery of necessary supplies to alleviate the suffering of
the civilian victims of the war. Simply by virtue of its enormous
financial contributions, its position in the world community,
and its presence in relif negotiations the United States does
fall into the class of active participant.
Other nations have not. so restricted themselves and their
actions bear, a striking resemblance to the earlier colonial
competition and involvement which exploited both African lives
and wealth regardless of the damage done to the native resources.
In reality, it was not long before the conflict assumed
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proportion;' much larger than a civil war. The combatants
received support from the same powers that had competed for the
same territory in earlier times. The only exception to this
statement must be the addition of one new non-African world power
to the West African arena -- the Soviet Union.
PORTUGUAL . Only one day after he proclaimed Biafra's secession,
Ojukwu stated he would "deal wi th. the devil, if .necessary" to
insure Biafra's survival.- As Africa's oldest surviving colonial
enemy, Portugual most accurately fits that description, Portugual
was the first and only European country at: the outbreak of the
combat to o -r fer Biafra telecommunication facilities and landing
248
rights for the airlift of supplies, Soon there were eight trans-
port aircraft flying from Lisbon to Biafra about which the
Portuguese government would onlry state it knew of "foreign
aircraft transporting, foreign goods . , . [but Portugual] has
249
nothing to do with it," The veracity of sueh a' statement is
highly questionable when it is considered that whatever the
ultimate outcome, open warfare in !; igoria--the longer; the better--
could not help but assist the Portuguese interests in Africa, It.
would to a large degree remove the strong pressures put on
Portugual to grant her African eolonies independence, as it-
would create some diversion of publicity from Portuguese colonies.
It would also give Portugual substantial verbal ammunition
against the ever-present African nationalistic movements of
which Nigeria was one of its strongest advocates on that continent,
Unf or Innately for Ojukwu, the Portuguese intention was not to
create another new African independent state to ultimately
oppose its policies, but simply to destroy an existing Nigeria,
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Just as in the clays of slave trading, Portugual was playing
Africans' against Africans in order to maximize Portuguese goals*
GREAT BRITAIN i At least on the surface Nigeria was in much more
satisfactory company with regard to her external sources of
support. Not only were her active supporters motivated toward
the end of "one Nigeria" , but there were two major sources of
supply competing against each, other in a manner which enured to
N iger ia ' s ma ter ial bene f it
,
Britain maintained that she had always been Nigeria"
s
"traditional supplier" of military equipment and that she would
continue a supply of "traditional" arms , There was some truth in
such a statement, but from 1964 until the outbreak of hostilities.




of armored cars and ceremonial uniforms. Initially Britain
allowed more substantial assistance than that in the form of
anti-aircraft guns, rifles and boats, but it flatly rejected
251
Nigerian requests for a squadron of fighter aircraft.
Subsequently Britain increased the nature of her military assistance
to include large quantities of modern military equipment for
ground warfare, but steadfastly refused to provide any sort of
o f fen s ive aircraft.
One of Britain'-s most obvious reasons for supporting Nigeria
was that she had created the country from diverse tribal areas
and "Britain had Ion", hoped that Nigeria would be a prosperous
252
and influential force in Africa." If Nigeria foundered because
of the civil war, it would constitute another ghost to haunt a
now already second-class Britain. The resultant loss of respect
caused by Nigerian failure would reflect even more damage on the
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already wounded British pride,
In addition to respect.; another major reason for British
support of Nigeria was economic. Britain is the largest foreign
investor in Nigerian industry and Nigeria is a dependent importer
of British goods. Any disruption of the Federation could only
adversely affect the pr ' wealth of Britain. The ever-
increasing importance of Nigerian, petroleum is one example.
Shortly after the outbreak of the war Biafra threatened to
nationalize all assets of foreign businesses that continued to
deal with [Nigeria. The British would have lost approximately
253
$240-million by such a move in the former Eastern Region
.
As long as Britain supported Nigeria she could be certain
of retaining her Migerian assets and possibly regaining those
in Biafra, If she supported Biafra in any way she could be
certain of losing her Nigerian assets without the benefit of any
concrete assurances from Biafra, Finally, by selling arms to
Nigeria Britain increased an already strong economic dependency.
If she refused to sell, arms would be purchased elsewhere arid
British ties would be only weakened.
SOV 1ET U"^ 1ON . When Britain refused to sell aircraft, a new,'
non-colonial power, yet one very steeped in the observance of
traditional rules to obtain its own neo-colonial economic values,
immediately filled the Nigerian request. By mid -August 1967, the
Federal Goveri ' had received at Kano six MIG-17 fighters, four
or five Czech L-29 jet trainers and 20 Ilushin-28 bombers, complete
254
with armament and Soviet military experts. The Russion terms
were quite generous: the MIGs were obtained in exchange for




Uni1 I I Lc. And so the USSR bec< lu Lcora
bedfellow of Gr< at Britain in supporting the Nigerian causi .
One wri h tated
i
Whatever i1 i xplan. I Ion for the record, Moscow's ulterior motive
for supplying Lagos with MIG's, torpedo boats and more than 200
"technicians" was apparent from the start. Oner again, Moscow
was trying to gain a foothold on a continent where past power
plays had produced an almost unbroken chain of failures. 256
Soon after Nigerian receipt of the Russian aircraft a Federal
ovnied rad io s t a t ion b r o a d c a s t
:
Ironically enough, it was. one of the nations which Nigeria used
to treat with fear arid suspicion that has turned out to be her
greatest friend in her most trying hours. This nation is the
Soviet Union. 2 57
The Soviet military aid opened a door which then led to the
conclusion of a $140-million economic and technical assistance
258
agreement signed in Lagos in November 1968.
Not only had the Soviets achieved a substantial position
in Africa by virtue of the Nigerian assistance, but what made
t
the Soviet victory twice as sweet was the complete change of
previous Nigerian policy -.toward the communist countries. Nigeria
had deliberately delayed the establishment of relations with
the Soviet Unions imposed restrictions on the size of the Soviet
mission in Lagos; restricted travel to the Soviet-bloc; limited
the importation of communist literature; discouraged Soviet-bloc
aid and trade; had proposed a "two-China" policy and supported
India in her dispute with China; had concluded a defense pact
with Britain; permitted the establishment of a secret NATO
radio station in Nigeria; and cooperated with American space
programs j had refused to attend the Belgrade Conference of
Non-aligned Nations; and had adopted a policy of silence, or
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worse, on Cuba, Berlin, and t] j sumption of United States
"259
nuclear tests, to cite some examples,
Not only did Moscow provide substantial military assistance
,
but it also complicated the British position by removing the
threat of British sanctions if Nigeria was not felt in the eyes
of London to be conducting the war properly. Britain could no
longer threaten to withdraw her military support. If she did so,
Russia was more than willing to fill the gap and so Nigeria
would lean even more toward the east.
EGYPT . The Russian support also brought aid from Nasser who
took his cue from Moscow. Another reason for Egyptian participation
has been suggested as a factor: "The principal leaders in Lagos
were fellow Moslems and the Ibos were not only Christians, but
had openly identified their cause with Israel's struggle to create
260
a. homeland." Such a statement may at first seem far-fetched,
yet the pilots of the Nigerian Air Force planes which indiscriminately
bombed Biafran civilians*were almost exclusively Egyptians.
FRANCE . It seems impossible that Biafra could have Withstood the
power alignment behind the Nigerian military effort when her
Portuguese support was so weak. That situation was the case when
by August 1963, Biafran equipment and morale had reached its
lowest point. General. Gowon could justifiably be confident when
he again gave one of his many victory predictions. He would not
have been so assured if he had known that another old colonial
power, , France, had quietly entered the West African arena again
on behalf of Biafra.
At first France gave Biafra a modest injection of foreign




began underwriting the costs of ferrying- in the military supplies.
Soon French financial and military aid began to increase and by
September 1963, three to four flights of French arms began to
rrive nightly at the Uli air strip from French speaking Gabon
3 the Ivory Coast, Although the French refused to openly
acknowledge their role, it has been called "one of the worst kept
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secrets of the war" and was quite universally reported. The
French not only began to fulfill the Biafran's material military
needs, but at least equally important, she openly declared support:
for the Biafran cause.
The formal recognition of Biafra by other relatively unimportant
nations in the world arena had only a slight effect when compared
to a statement by Charles De Gualle on July 31, 1968, that:
The [French] Government notes that the bloodshed and
suffering endured by the peoples of,Biafra for more than a
year show their will to affirm themselves as a people.
Faithful to this principle, the French Government believes
that, as. a result, the present conflict should be resolved
on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination
... e 263
F ranee ha s never a c c ord ed Biafra f orma 1 re c ogn i t i on , bu
t
the boost to Ojukwu's government was tremendous. The impact on
the oeace talks scheduled for Addis Ababa on August 5, was
264
disasterous-. Not only were the hopes for settlement dashed,
but so were Nigerian bones of military success. The "final push"
of September 1963 was blunted because of French support. The
Biafrans regained the town of Uli and captured two oil wells to
the south, Ff those petroleum sources had not been captured, it
was estimated that Biafra* s fuel stocks would have been depleted
265
in weeks. With the French support, the military situation
has been able to remain relatively static to this date and there
is little prospect o<~ change.
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The reason for France's untimely action is not as evident
as the other active participants. One person in Africa is
reported to have stated that it "was to spite the British, who
are backing Nigeria, to spite the .Americans, and because they
want to show off their muscle in Africa and take on the role of
266
the protectors of the persecuted . " Enigmatic as the French
actions sometimes seem to be, it is unlikely that their presence
in Biafra is merely for spite.
The general consensus of opinion among journalists is that
"French-subsidized oil interests could gain a major share of
267
Britain's oil concessions if Biafr:-: wins." There may be some
truth to these charges, but it should be noted that France '
s
support did not come until virtually all of the petroleum producing
areas had been lost by Biafra. A much more logical time to
intervene would have been upon the declaration of secession or
any time before Biafra' s position became so limited. If the
French intention was to create an offensive force in Biafra which
would regain the production areas, that intent could not be inferred
from the military assistance given which consisted almost entirelv
268
of bolt action rifles and ammunition -- hardly sufficient for a
major Biafran offensive against their well equiped opponents.
Only if Biafra were able to resist long enough to force a settle-
ment which will include sovereignty over many non-Ibo lands would
the French gain from such a motive.
The most likely reason for France's support of the rebels
is that if the war continues long enough world opinion will force
Nigeria to accept some sort of very loose federation of its
major tribal areas. A massive Iligeria has then been prevented
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from becoming a dominant power to I West kfi Lean ttions
replacing the now almost: colonial control. France still holds in
sonic; of those countries . Wha1 Fi ich policy will be withoui
the leadership of Ch rles De Gaulle remains an open question, but
no change in French Biafran policy has been observed yet.
V. CJ • ' ON
The cost of the war in Nigeria h< ; b en tremendous relativ
to the size of the country both in its economic effect and in
tor 1 '!"5 of the destruction of human lives. The Federal Government
has lost primarily in terms of i rial values ere 1 the East in
the we 11 -be in,r;, of its people.
In one and one-half years of war, Nigeria's reserves have;
been reduced from h 75-million to I- 36-million; a substantial
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amount when the 1966 gross natio i ' ! product was only $14. 5-billion.
Much needed capital inflow dropped $18'-million in 1.965 alone
because of the internal conflict and the country* s gro Eh r. te
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that year declined from. 5.6 per cent to roughly 3 per cei I At
the beginning of the calendar year 1969, the total, cost of the
war in damage and loss of business opportunities to Nigeria was
estimated at approximately $960-million. Approximately $240*-
million alone will be required to repair the damage to public
facilities alone. In addition, Nigeria's six year nation?
1
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development nlan has fallen at least three years behind schedule.
The ear L< loss to the Biafrans, while .impossible to
calculate at this time, i.s of only minor importance when compare 3
to the enormous destruction of human lives and the permanent
c age to many of its next generation who might survive.
125,000 death; f: om starvation per month is a pitiful indictme
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of the system of mainta] Lng blic orde: in th rid today.
It becomes even more frightening when that number of deaths is
the product of a territory who: lation is now numbered at
best only eight million persons,
Today's war in Nigeria bears such a striking resemblance
to the events of its early history that some comment is reqi ed..
Just as in the days of the slave trade, the combatants are
Nigerians, but those who are most likely to ultimately gain are,
with the exception of the Soviet Union and Egypt, the sai
colonial powers who competed in the same arena once before.
Nigerian lives and assets are being destroyed to satisfy
European values, These values may no longer be the economic
gain from the sale of slaves and palm oil, but African lives are
being sacrificed and it is ultimately European econ ' interests
i
which are at the foundation of the support of all the hon~
combatant active participants.
The war is one in which Africans are using European terms,
concepts and arms to destroy each other because of -a strict
adherance to norms conceived in an earlier time and another place
which should not be controlling in any present day arena when
the mass destruction of human values must be sacraficed to their
alter* Russia is a prime example of the use of tradition;
]
concepts to achieve her political ends. Nigeria is just one
example, but it is one arena in which the Soviet policy is
definitely bearing fruit: the ultimate go:.] of which is the
destruction of any useful institutions designed i:o r:a Lmize t
values of the African peoples.
Words such as democracy and genocide are relevant to the

functioning cT ' relations in today's wo Ld , bul only wh
Lned and used in a propei i i ttext . Both the Unit*
States and the Soviel Union profess to be "de loi tic", but an
analysis of tb hier< rchy of values and institutional structure
of these t 1 o na1 ion states will reveal the irrelevance of the
word symbol "democracy" if it is not properly ex* ined j just
the same as was the case in the use of genocide claims on behalf
of the Biafrans or Ibos, Only by factual examination and application
in particular circumstan s do such symbols take on. an effective
meanir
The example of Nigerian politics is ind tive of the disast<
that befalls strict adherance to norms established by word symbols
which create a totally different system than is workable when a
factual context is changed. Superficial examination of Nigerian
politics before secession created an impression of norma lacy when
in truth the whole political system v?as unworkable in an intensely
irmlti- tribal nation. It. is particularly interesting to note as
f
an exampl e of the violence done to traditional Western politics].
concepts that the greatest degree of falsification occurred ir
Nigeria not where the internal power struggle was the greatest,
but where there was the least contest,. Candidates were falsely
returned unopposed where they had the least prospect, of losing.
Regardless of how the present conflict is ulti I ly resolved,
the survivors must attempt to achieve a political process in
which people with base values can effectively act through the ir
institutions upon resources to aohi eve their desired values as
an end without necessarily following the forms of political
structure forced upon them by a completely different- culture.
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will b« cannot be said a1 this time, but it 5
for the Africans th Ives to resolve not burdened by eith
colonial or neo-colonial int ntions. Th Lmpoj tant fact at
this point is that without France and Portugual, Biafra would
never have been able to carry out the role of a combatant for
any more than a brief time. Conversely, Nigeria, without the
British and Soviet support' might .just as well have failed.
Surely the receive among the Biafrans would not have been created
without an air force created and operated under a foreign influence
so powerful the Nigerian decision-makers \ re unable to control
i ts ac ti ens t
The destruction of the present war is primarily the fault
of non-African influence, both historic and present, but its
solution should be left to Africans alone. Pressure to reach a
solution should be applied by all nations and international
organizations of the world community, but none should be in the
form of any military aid to the combatants. At' the present stage
of the conflict,' both the United Stater and the United Nations
are in excellent positions to intervene to minimize the already
deplorable destruction that has already taken place. Neither of
these institutions is tainted with the historical background or
the self-serving interests of the other participants, yet both
are in the position of leaders in the world community.
What sort of a solution is feasible? The longer the conflict
continues, the harder it becomes to reconcile the disputants,
The greater the destruction to the Nigerian economy, the harder
it will be to integrate the secessionist Ibos into Nigerian
society again. The longer tec- Federal Government continues the

8]
war, t! Biafran wil] die and the greater will beco tl
i i solve of the survivors because of the created fc::r of th<
consequences of sui i i ler . Yet surrender they must. If Biafra
were to become an ind* . ndent state within the territory it
now has undi c its control, it would be completely dependent upon
a hostile Nige] i . It would have no support: lea resources otb
than human , not possessed of sufficient agricultural or economic
potential to support itself. If Biafra were to be granted
ind<
;
nd ice and the entire Eastern Region, or even some productive
sections a] granted in order to create a viable state, then
either unwilling minorities must: be included, creating only a
smellier Nigeria to erupt again in a Efik or Ekois rebellion or
the minorities will be excluded which will create another
Palestinian refugee situation. Both are unsatisfactory solutions
to the creation of minimum world public order.
An independent state of Biafra would become an example the
t
most likely would lead to a whole sucession of largely ineffective
mini-states throughout Africa founded solely on the basis o r
tribal allegiances. In Nigeria alone the Yoruba have often
271
indicated if Biafra succeeds, then they will secede also.
Should Nigeria fall apart, the fixture of many other African nations
will be cast in the same dye.
There are those who insist on a "fight to the finish", but
they lack not only a sense of realism, but of humanity as well,
Guerrilla warfare has been threatened by the Biafrans and if a
totally military solution is sought, it is certain to be a result.
Such a war would only result in greater destruction and would
make it almost impossible to distribute relief supplies to the

wo] i and c hi 3 en wh woul< Inevitably die in the bi is! i a s 1
27 2
already hap 1 in such i isl • in th< present conflict.
The first stop to a solution of the conflict must be a .
complete cessa Lor of armed combats In order to achieve such a
result, the Uni1 ) States and the United Nations must force the
active non-co ib . it pai ; Lcip, nts to withdraw all military aid
to both sides just as other nations have done. Without such
materia] support, eventual!}'' a peaceful solution must be sought.
The sooner the combatants realize they* will lose their milita]
capabilities , the sooner they vzi 11 become more receptive to tern
of compromise
•
The terms of any compromise must be settled through the
Organization of African Unity for its members must realize the
values at stake in the entire community and can most effectively
aid in the creation of institutions appropriate to the African
arena, the least burdened by European concepts, that may ultimately
serve as a model to create a more stable Africa -that wi.1 1 become
a respected and powerful participant in the world arena in its
own right. Then the lesson taught by Nigerian dissention ma)7
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